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Originalism Talk: A Legal History
Mary Ziegler *
Progressives have long recognized the tremendous political appeal of
originalism. For many scholars, originalism appears to have succeeded
because it achieves results consistent with conservative values but
promises judicial neutrality to the public. By drawing on new historical
research on anti-abortion constitutionalism, this Article argues for a
radically different understanding of the originalist ascendancy.
Contrary to what we often think, conservative social movements at
times made significant sacrifices in joining an originalist coalition.
These costs were built in to what this Article calls originalism talk—the
use of arguments, terms, and objectives associated with conservative
originalism.
Scholars have documented the costs confronted by social movements
reliant on rights-based rhetoric, particularly when activists seek social
change in the courts. Originalism talk was similarly constraining. By
becoming part of an originalist coalition, abortion opponents increased
their influence over the selection of federal judicial nominees. At the
same time, in stressing originalist rhetoric, abortion opponents had to
publically mute their longstanding constitutional commitments
involving the right to life, the personhood of the fetus, and the existence
of rights based in natural law or human-rights principles.
The story of anti-abortion constitutionalism offers insight into
progressive attempts to create a doctrinally satisfying and politically
resonant alternative to conservative originalism. Often the issue is how
to create an interpretive method that accomplishes as much as
originalism: advancing progressive constitutional beliefs while
appealing to the public’s interest in the rule of law. As this Article shows,
however, it is not clear that the benefits of belonging to the originalist
coalition outweigh its costs.

* Mary Ziegler is the Stearns, Weaver, Miller Professor of Law at Florida State University
College of Law. She would like to thank Caitlin Borgmann, Al Brophy, Deborah Dinner, Joel
Goldstein, Roger Goldman, Sophia Lee, Serena Mayeri, Eric Miller, Martha Minow, Karen
Tani, and Anders Walker for sharing their thoughts on the research and writing of earlier drafts
of the article.
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INTRODUCTION
Progressives have long recognized the tremendous political
appeal of originalism. 1 To a significant extent, the progressive
constitutional project has been an effort to identify the salient
features of popular originalism and to create an equally resonant and
popular progressive alternative. 2 Generally, the story goes,
conservative originalism was a political success because it offered a
perfect fit between conservative ends and a seemingly impartial
interpretive means. 3 Understood in this way, originalism represents a
perfectly subtle and seemingly innocuous strategy to introduce
conservative values into American constitutional law.
Drawing on new historical research on anti-abortion
constitutionalism, this Article argues for a radically different
understanding of the originalist ascendancy. For many of its
constituents, belonging to the conservative originalist coalition
involved a complex and painful set of tradeoffs—the sacrifice of
cherished principles for immediate political gain.
Viewed as a constitutional movement, the early anti-abortion
cause enjoyed at best an ambiguous relationship with originalism.
Originalism’s message of neutrality, respect for democratic values,
and constitutional fidelity resonated with certain grassroots activists
and academic commentators. However, in the late 1960s and early
1. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily, & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling
Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011) (offering an empirical explanation of popular
support for originalism); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 681 (2009);
Dawn Johnsen, Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the Twenty-first
Century, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 241 (2007); James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the
Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1529–38 (2011)
(documenting “the rise of conservative originalism during the Reagan era and . . . its success in
shaping the conversation about the Constitution”).
2. See, e.g., Greene, Selling Originalism, supra note 1, at 661 (arguing “that an
account of why originalism is successful is crucial to fundamentally non-originalist interpretive
theories”); Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis?: Progressives’ Quest to Reclaim the Constitution and
the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1207–08 (2011).
3. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due
Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 548 (2012); Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1689 (2012); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a
Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 572 (2006)
(“Originalism is so powerfully appealing because conservatives have succeeded in fusing
contemporary political concerns with authoritative constitutional narrative.”); Reva B. Siegel,
Comment, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 191, 201–36 (2008) (showing the rise of originalism as seen in the gun rights
movement).
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1970s, the anti-abortion movement—a key part of a later originalist
coalition—defended a constitutional agenda based on the
Declaration of Independence, human rights law, substantive due
process precedents, biological evidence, and common-law opinions
on fetal personhood. 4 This agenda enjoyed broad lay support across
otherwise divided grassroots groups.
When anti-abortion constitutionalism took its place as part of a
broader conservative constitutional agenda, movement leaders acted
as much for strategic as for substantive reasons. In the early years of
Ronald Reagan’s first term, administration attorneys helped to
transform originalism into a political practice—an effort “to forge a
vibrant connection between the Constitution and contemporary
conservative values.” 5 Becoming part of the originalist coalition
allowed abortion opponents to influence the selection of judicial
nominees and to increase the chances that Roe v. Wade would be
overruled. 6 However, conservative originalism promised far less than
the constitutional change abortion opponents had demanded. For
decades, abortion opponents had fought to establish a right to life
that would be protected from the vicissitudes of ordinary politics. At
most, an originalist court would return the abortion issue to the
states—an
outcome
long
dreaded
by
anti-abortion
7
constitutionalists.
The story of anti-abortion constitutionalism offers an important
new perspective on historical and theoretical works on originalism.
Historians convincingly describe how originalism functions as a
political practice. In short, the argument goes, social movements
gravitate toward originalism because originalism articulates values
that activists share and promises outcomes that movements want.
The history of anti-abortion constitutionalism shows instead that
social movements at times made significant sacrifices in joining an
originalist coalition. These costs were built in to what this Article
calls “originalism talk”—the use of arguments, reasoning, and
objectives associated with first-generation originalism.
4. These strategies are discussed in infra Part II.
5. Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 569.
6. On the influence of originalism on federal judicial nominations, see, e.g., Jamal
Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 72 (2009); Peter J. Smith & Robert
W. Tuttle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional Originalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693,
743–44 (2011).
7. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.

871

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/22/2015 3:31 PM

2014

Scholars have documented the costs confronted by social
movements reliant on rights-based rhetoric, particularly when activists
sought social change in the courts. 8 Originalism talk required similar
tradeoffs. Originalist rhetoric helped rally members disheartened by
the movement’s lack of progress. It reformulated demands for social
change in a way that seemed part of a respectable legal tradition.
Originalism talk allowed abortion opponents to “raise consciousness,
fundraise, and bargain with state decision makers.” 9 At the same time,
in stressing originalist rhetoric, abortion opponents had to publically
mute their longstanding constitutional commitments involving the
right to life, the personhood of the fetus, and the existence of rights
based in natural law or human rights principles.
As Tomiko Brown-Nagin argues, the “hallmark” of effective
social movement activism is an effort “to directly influence public
policy by appealing directly to the public and a target audience of
decisionmakers, such as governmental representatives.” 10 Social
movements succeed when they influence public attitudes and raise
8. For an overview of this body of work, see, e.g., Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights:
An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1862 (1987); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and
Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 369–74
(2012); Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 713, 714–15, 719–21 (2011). Much of the scholarship on rights talk draws on
Stuart Scheingold’s work, demonstrating that rights claims were a political resource similar to
“money, numbers, status, and so forth.” STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 7 (2d ed. 2004). Some scholars argue
that rights reasoning can empower social movements, helping them to “raise [public]
consciousness, fundraise, and bargain with state decision makers.” Douglas NeJaime, The Legal
Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 668 (2012). For works in this vein, see, e.g.,
FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN
MODERN AMERICA (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2007); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT
ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2006); Deborah Dinner, The
Universal Childcare Debate: Rights Mobilization, Social Policy, and the Dynamics of Feminist
Activism, 1966–1974, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 577, 580 (2010). Other scholars stress the
constraints imposed by rights talk. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 74 (1987) (in the context of sex equality,
describing the way in which such rhetoric “perfectly obscures these collective realities behind
the mask of recognition of individual rights”); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY
EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 276–77 (1994); Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); cf. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW
AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991) (explaining how rights talk
both accommodated an existing social order and represented a kind of emancipatory discourse
for labor activists).
9. NeJaime, supra note 8, at 668.
10. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1503 (2005).
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the salience of the cause at issue. 11 Originalism talk limited the antiabortion movement’s ability to undertake this work in two ways:
First, by suppressing alternative claims, the movement’s allegiance to
originalism limited the manner in which members could describe
their grievances and goals. 12 Second, by focusing activists’ efforts on
interpretive methodology, originalism talk used up valuable resources
that could have been directed to changing public attitudes. 13 For its
constituents, originalism involved difficult tradeoffs. Historians tell a
far simpler story about the ways in which originalism served as a site
of social-movement mobilization. This Article begins to recapture
the complexity surrounding the creation of the originalist coalition.
The story of anti-abortion constitutionalism also makes an
important contribution to the theoretical literature, offering insight
into progressive attempts to create a convincing alternative to
conservative originalism. Often, the issue is how to create an
interpretive method that accomplishes as much as originalism:
advancing progressive constitutional beliefs while appealing to the
public’s interest in the rule of law. As this Article shows, however, it
is not clear that the benefits of belonging to the originalist coalition
outweigh its costs. We should study whether progressive social
movements should forge an alternative to conservative originalism,
not simply how they should do so.

11. For a discussion of the relationship between social movements, public attitudes, and
social change, see, e.g., PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE
NEW DEAL 90 (1998); JOSEPH E. LUDERS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE LOGIC
OF SOCIAL CHANGE 200 (2010) (noting “a general congruence between public opinion and
policy outcomes” in social-movement politics, particularly when there is “mass attentiveness”);
LAURA L. TOUSSAINT, THE CONTEMPORARY US PEACE MOVEMENT 74 (2009) (arguing that
“social control must . . . be viewed by the general public as illegitimate in order to facilitate
broad-based support for [a social] movement”); S. LAUREL WELDON, PROTEST, POLICY, AND
THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 186
(2002) (contending that “[s]ocial movements are aimed primarily at social transformation”
and work “by changing social meanings or values”).
12. Cf. Mark Fathi Massoud, Do Victims of War Need International Law? Human
Rights Education Programs in Authoritarian Sudan, 45 LAW &. SOC’Y REV. 1, 17 (2011)
(explaining that “rights talk tends to narrow or limit the discursive resources available to civil
society groups by suppressing alternative claims”).
13. Similar criticisms have been made in discussing litigation as a tool for social change.
See, e.g., Scott Barclay et al., Two Spinning Wheels: Studying Law and Social Movements, 54
STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 1, 11 (2011) (“When lawyers appear in social movement studies, they
are mostly characterized as hired guns who exhaust a movement’s scarce resources . . . .”).
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The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I situates the Article in
the existing literature on conservative constitutionalism and the prolife movement. To the extent that histories document the
development of anti-abortion constitutionalism, scholars position it
as part of a broader narrative about the rise of originalism. Part II
begins to develop an alternative story about anti-abortion
constitutionalism, focusing on the years between 1965 and 1981.
The movement promoted a right to live based not on text, history,
or the intentions of the framers of the Constitution, but rather on
the Declaration of Independence and substantive due process. Part
III charts the decline of this constitutional agenda in the 1980s as
movement leaders identified practical reasons for endorsing the
emerging originalist agenda. Part IV explores the stakes of this
history, and Part V offers a brief conclusion.
I. CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY
For most historians and legal theorists, conservative originalism
is a success story. Generally speaking, “[o]riginalism regards the
discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial
adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional
interpretation in the present.” 14 Irrespective of any of its flaws or
doctrinal inconsistencies, conservative originalism apparently enjoys
meaningful popular support while delivering the constitutional
results its constituents desire. Scholars across the ideological
spectrum work to explain how to preserve or duplicate the influence
that conservative originalism now enjoys. As this Section shows,
however, current scholarship largely misses the deep costs incurred
by the movements that have joined the originalist political coalition.
Studying anti-abortion constitutionalism allows us to recover the lost
history of conservative originalism’s tradeoffs.
Originalism often plays a part in larger histories of the political
right. While the history of conservative constitutionalism remains
understudied, a well-developed political history of the Republican
Party and the grassroots Right has taken shape in recent decades. 15
14. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599
(2004).
15. On the history of the conservative movement, see, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW,
THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE POLITICAL HISTORY
(2007); DONALD T. CRITCHLOW & NANCY MACLEAN, DEBATING THE AMERICAN
CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT, 1945 TO PRESENT (2009); DAVID FARBER, THE RISE AND FALL

874

DO NOT DELETE

869

5/22/2015 3:31 PM

Originalism Talk: A Legal History

After World War II, some American scholars, activists, and politicians
launched an attack on the progressive liberal order created during
the rise of the New Deal. 16 For decades, the triumph of this
conservative movement may have seemed improbable. In the 1940s
and 1950s, the movement was bitterly divided between moderates
concerned about alienating Republican Party centrists and activists
convinced that the Party had forsaken its principles. 17 Grassroots
advocates promoted strong positions on anti-communism and small
government, while moderates urged their colleagues to back
positions and candidates that would help the party win elections.
Before the 1960s, as historian Donald Critchlow explains:
Conservatism had found a voice in a small group of intellectuals,
but its influence was limited intellectually and politically. A strident
anti-Communism had gained popular acceptance among grassroots
activists, but its fervor was never shared by the majority of
Americans. 18

Some activists belonging to organizations like the John Birch
Society, an ultra-right, anticommunist group, helped to fuel
Democratic Party allegations that the Right was “racially prejudiced,
xenophobic, and easily manipulated by demagogues . . . .” 19 Even
within the Republican Party, tensions between movement
conservatives and party veterans were high. 20 However, the failed
nomination of conservative Barry Goldwater, a darling of those who
despised the East Coast Republican Establishment, set the stage for
later conservative successes. 21 During the Goldwater campaign,
OF MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: A SHORT HISTORY (2010); KEVIN MATTSON,
REBELS ALL!: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONSERVATIVE MIND IN POSTWAR AMERICA
(2008); GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
SINCE 1945 (3d ed. 2006); RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE
1970S (Bruce J. Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008).
16. See, e.g., CRITCHLOW & MACLEAN, supra note 15, at 55–57; George Schneider,
The Old Right, in CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA SINCE 1930: A READER 5 (Gregory L.
Schneider ed., 2003).
17. On the divisions within the Republican Party in the 1940s and 1950s, see, e.g.,
MARY C. BRENNAN, TURNING RIGHT IN THE SIXTIES: THE CONSERVATIVE CAPTURE OF THE
GOP 17 (1995); ROBERT MASON, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND AMERICAN POLITICS FROM
HOOVER TO REAGAN 132 (2012); LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OF
THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT 115 (2001).
18. CRITCHLOW & MACLEAN, supra note 15, at 40.
19. Id. at 65.
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. On the influence of Goldwater’s failure, see, e.g., J. WILLIAM MIDDENDORF II, A
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extremist activists channeled their efforts into grassroots political
organizing, and after 1964, factional divisions gradually healed.
Ronald Reagan’s landslide 1980 victory represented the culmination
of a revolution in American politics, as Democrats and Republicans
voted overwhelmingly for a man who symbolized many of the
conservative movement’s beliefs. 22
If the political history of the conservative movement is well
developed, much of its legal and constitutional history remains to be
unearthed. We can understand conservative constitutionalism partly
as a network of foundations, educational institutions, and elite
organizations. Steven Teles’s path-breaking work in this vein frames
legal conservatism partly as a system of influence. 23 In this account,
conservatives worked to gain control of elite institutions as a way of
influencing the courts and creating a supply of lawyers and potential
judges. 24 Teles argues that legal mobilization took shape in response
to the world created by liberal elites in the 1960s, a world that put a
premium on knowledge and credentials. 25 Other scholars have taken
a similar approach, studying the cardinal traits of attorneys
advocating for right-wing causes or the creation of elite conservative

GLORIOUS DISASTER: BARRY GOLDWATER’S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE ORIGINS OF
CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT xii (2006) (“The organization that [was] created to win the
Republican nomination for Barry Goldwater . . . and the conservative vision that attracted so
many supporters came to represent a new baseline for the Republican Party . . . . [E]fforts to
elect Barry Goldwater gave muscle to the embryonic conservative movement . . . .”); Gillian
Peele, American Conservatism in Historical Perspective, in CRISIS OF CONSERVATISM?: THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY, THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT, & AMERICAN POLITICS AFTER BUSH
15, 22 (Joel D. Aberbach & Gillian Peele eds., 2011) (arguing that Goldwater’s defeat
“signaled that the right could capture the Republican party,” “dramatically broadened the
conservative element in the Republican ranks,” and made disparate factions “into a unified
movement”).
22. See, e.g., JEFFREY HOWISON, RONALD REAGAN AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT xviii (2014) (“[T]he victory of Ronald Reagan [in
1980] signaled the ascendancy of the conservative movement in American society”); Nancy
MacLean, Guardians of Privileges, in CRITCHLOW & MACLEAN, supra note 15 at 162 (“[F]or
conservative movement builders, [Reagan’s] 1980 election was an epochal victory”).
23. Steven M. Teles, Conservative Mobilization Against Entrenched Liberalism, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF
CONSERVATISM 160 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007); STEVEN M. TELES, THE
RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW
(2008) [hereinafter TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT].
24. See TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at
4, 6, 9–10, 13.
25. See id.
THE
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institutions like the Federalist Society. 26 These new institutions
created important opportunities for debate. In this vibrant
intellectual environment, the ideas of original intent (and later
original meaning) took shape. 27
But as scholars recognize, conservative constitutionalism consists
not only of a set of institutional arrangements but also a group of
arguments. 28 Current scholarship identifies some forms of originalism
as the defining feature of recent conservative constitutional thought
and political action. 29
The term originalism, of course, has a history of its own. While
James Bradley Thayer had called for “judicial restraint” as early as
1893, 30 the promotion of a jurisprudence of original intent came
later when, in the late 1960s and 1970s, conservative scholars
developed powerful criticisms of the Warren Court. During the 1968
presidential election, Richard Nixon promised to nominate “strict
constructionists” who, in Nixon’s words, would “interpret the
Constitution . . . [and] not twist or bend the Constitution in order
to perpetuate his personal political and social views.” 31 In 1971,
when Nixon nominated William Rehnquist to the Supreme Court,
the future Justice gave some content to the idea of strict
constructionism, suggesting that judges should be limited by “the

26. For further examples, see e.g., ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008); George W. Hicks, Jr., The
Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the Harvard Law School Student Body,
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 623 (2006).
27. See, e.g., SOUTHWORTH, supra note 26, at 124, 130 (describing groups, like the
Heritage Foundation and the American Conservative Union, that favor a jurisprudence of
original constitutional intent); TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT,
supra note 23, at 145.
28. For analyses of the tenets of conservative constitutionalism, see, e.g., ROBIN WEST,
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
211–212 (1994); Erwin Chemerinsky, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the
United States Enters the 21st Century, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55–59 (2004);
Johnsen, supra note 1, at 240.
29. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical
Possibilities and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 286 (2011) (“Two of the
conservative intellectual movement’s central commitments make originalism its most
compatible theory of constitutional interpretation.”); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative
Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 673 (1990) (“Judicial restraint and originalism
constitute the core of a conservative theory of constitutional interpretation.”).
30. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF.
L. REV. 519, 522 (2012).
31. Whittington, supra note 14, at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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language used by the framers, [and] the historical materials
available . . . .” 32 Throughout the 1970s, scholars like Robert Bork
and Raoul Berger elaborated on the idea of a jurisprudence based on
original intent. 33 By the mid-1980s, with the selection of Edwin
Meese III as attorney general, Reagan administration officials and
scholars christened the interpretive method championed by Warren
Court critics as “originalism.” 34
The kind of originalist thought pioneered in the 1970s and
1980s has become known as first-generation conservative
originalism. 35 More recently, different schools of originalist theory
have emerged: progressive, libertarian, and conservative, for
example, or other theories based on original meaning versus original
intent. 36 Outside of the academy, as Robert Post and Reva Siegel
explain, conservative originalism is both an interpretive method and
a political practice. 37 It is with this strand of originalist thought and
practice that the history of anti-abortion constitutionalism intersects.
32. Noms. of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary United States S., 92d Cong. 55 (1971) (Statement of William Rehnquist,
S. Ct. nominee).
33. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 14, at 600–03.
34. On coining of the term originalism and its embrace by Meese, see, e.g., id. at 599;
TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 145
(suggesting that Meese “originated not the idea, but the nomenclature of original intent
jurisprudence”).
35. For uses of the term “first-generation” originalist, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for
Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, Heller &
Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2009).
36. Some commentators prioritize the original expected application of the relevant
constitutional text. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 135 (1997); John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 758–72, 784–85 (2009). Other commentators focus
on the original semantic meaning of the text, stated at the level of generality found in the text.
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); Whittington,
supra note 14, at 599. On the difference between new and old originalism, see, e.g., Thomas B.
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714–16 (2011). Randy
Barnett’s libertarian originalism is one variety of new originalism, see, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–130 (2004), as
is Jack Balkin’s progressive originalism, see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–4,
14–16, 23–34 (2011).
37. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 3.
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For progressives, the success of conservative originalism poses the
most intriguing historical question. Many studies contend that firstgeneration originalism is intellectually incoherent, based on the
problematic concept of collective intention and on subjective and
shallow “law office history,” 38 but the success of conservative
originalism outside of the academy matches any setbacks faced within
it. Conservative originalist thought plays an important role in
Supreme Court decision-making, federal judicial nominations, and
conservative political mobilization. 39 Popular support for conservative
originalism appears to reflect some level of substantive support for its
basic tenets. 40 The issue, for progressives, is how to counter the
surprising and persistent popularity of conservative originalism.
Uncovering the secret of conservative originalism’s success
requires an understanding of what it promises both grassroots
activists and the general public. According to Robin West,
“conservative constitutionalists view private or social normative
authority as the legitimate and best source of guidance for state
action” and see “both the Constitution and constitutional
adjudication as a means of preserving and protecting that
authority.” 41 Erwin Chemerinsky identifies as defining traits of
conservative constitutionalism a desire “to narrow . . . federal
power . . . , to restrict access to the [federal] courts, . . . to expand []
aid to religion, . . . to limit the scope of individual rights, . . . [and to

38. Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295,
301 (2011) (suggesting that originalism relies on law office history); see also Laurence H.
Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra
note 36, at 68–72 (describing the impossibility of determining the level of abstraction at which
constitutional clauses should be read and applied; Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial
Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6, 101–02 (1999)
(describing the failure of originalists to adhere to the original meaning of “commerce”); Post
& Siegel, supra note 3, at 548–49 (“In recent decades, a large scholarly literature has
developed that is dedicated to exposing the analytic inconsistencies and theoretical deficiencies
of originalism.”); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 287 (2004) (describing “the vast body of
primary historical materials . . . that support a spectrum of constitutional meaning” and the
resulting failure of originalist methodology to restrain judicial interpretation).
39. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 545–46.
40. See, e.g., Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, supra note 1,
at 417.
41. WEST, supra note 28, at 212.
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limit the] scope of criminal defendants’ rights.” 42 Dawn Johnsen
summarizes conservative constitutional principles as follows:
Judges should respect the rule of law. They should rule according
to what the law says, not what they would prefer it to be. They
should not legislate from the bench or impose their own social or
political agenda. They should enforce the Constitution as written,
including limits on federal power. . . . [These statements] have
become the Right’s mantra . . . . Through decades of remarkable
discipline and repetition, conservatives have imbued these carefully
chosen, innocuous-sounding phrases with deeply contested and
radical ideological content. 43

Generally, conservative social movements are thought to have
gravitated toward originalism partly because it promised to deliver
on their legal and social goals. As Katherine Bartlett explains:
“originalism is less a coherent or compelling jurisprudence than a
‘political practice’ that seeks ‘to forge a vibrant connection between
the Constitution and contemporary conservative values.’” 44
Originalism is the quintessential conservative constitution project,
since it “was tied to conservative political projects and cultural
assumptions.” 45 As Robert Post and Reva Siegel explain:
“[o]riginalism remains even now a powerful vehicle for conservative
mobilization.” 46
For members of the public, originalism promised neutrality,
objectivity, and fidelity to the country’s founding principles—values
that would attract many who did not share the reform priorities of
movement conservatives. In the words of Earl Maltz, it was “this
potential for neutrality that account[ed] for the visceral appeal of
originalism.” 47 The failure of first-generation, conservative
originalism in the academy makes all the more impressive the success
of originalism in shaping the work of the Court and in retaining

42. Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 55–57.
43. Johnsen, supra note 1, at 240.
44. Bartlett, supra note 3, at 548 (quoting Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 569).
45. Greene, supra note 6, at 1689.
46. Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 546.
47. Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 794; see
also Michael McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions
into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (“The appeal of originalism is that the moral
principles so applied will be the foundational principles of the American Republic . . . and not
the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”).
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popular support. As Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily, and Stephen
Ansolabehere have shown, public support for originalism “expresses
a substantive legal, political, and cultural preference.” 48
In these accounts, conservative originalism has been a strategic
triumph. Conservative originalism proved tremendously attractive to
a general public interested in rule-of-law values. At the same time,
originalism proved to be an important weapon of movement
conservatives. In originalism, activists identified an interpretive
strategy that would forward their political values.
A careful study of groups composing the conservative originalist
coalition paints a more complex picture. The coalition pro-lifers
joined included a variety of movement organizations and actors,
including those naturally attracted to originalism’s message of
neutrality and constitutional fidelity. Others, like anti-abortion
leaders did not endorse originalism because it reflected movement
members’ deeply held constitutional principles. Nor did all the
members of a conservative originalist coalition benefit equally from
signing on to a new legal agenda. Instead, for abortion opponents,
endorsing originalism represented a strategic, if ultimately
unsatisfying, compromise. In this story, originalism was not simply a
theory of interpretation or a sophisticated tactical move. Instead,
originalism was a process of constitutional coalition-building with
clear tradeoffs.
Other historians have studied the rise, fall, and mysterious
staying power of conservative originalism. This project is unique,
however, in demonstrating how originalism talk constrained the
social movements that adopted it. Scholars have long demonstrated
how rights talk limits the ways in which social movements imagine,
describe, and demand social change. 49 Both rights talk and
originalism talk are extraordinarily flexible, albeit in different ways.
Because of the malleability of rights talk, grassroots movements can
“endow rights with capacious political meanings as part of broad
struggles for socioeconomic transformation.” 50 Given that
constitutional text and history can support many different
interpretations, conservative originalism similarly allows movements
to “infuse the law of the Constitution with [diverse] contemporary

48.
49.
50.

Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 1, at 417.
See supra nn.8–9 and accompanying text.
Dinner, supra note 8, at 580.
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political meanings.” 51 Moreover, both rights and originalism-based
contentions have mobilized social movements to challenge the status
quo in the courts. 52 Like rights rhetoric, originalist arguments can
affect every aspect of movement activity, as originalist rhetoric rallies
activists during presidential elections, judicial nomination hearings,
and litigation campaigns. 53
Nonetheless, as we shall see, originalism talk imposes unique
constraints not associated with the more capacious form of rights
talk. Whereas social movements have appealed to a rich and varied
set of sources in demanding rights, 54 originalist rhetoric identifies
constitutional authenticity as authoritative. 55 Originalist arguments
do not easily allow movements to turn to human rights law,
international law, natural law, or any other “unconventional” source
of a demand for change. 56 Moreover, it appears that, even outside of
the courts, originalism talk has primarily mobilized social movements
interested in change made through litigation. While movements
using rights talk as part of a court-based strategy often find
themselves constrained, social movements can, in other contexts,
mold rights claims to reflect a wide variety of transformative
demands. 57 By contrast, even in the political arena, the originalist
coalition mainly privileges the election of candidates and the
nomination of judges sympathetic to a particular interpretation of
the Constitution in the courts. 58 For the most part, the end-game
remains social change through litigation.

51. Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 560.
52. On originalism’s mobilizing potential, see, e.g., id. at 559, 568. On the potential of
rights talk to mobilize grassroots activists, see generally, e.g., KORNBLUH, supra note 8;
MACLEAN, supra note 8; Dinner, supra note 8 (“[P]opular rights consciousness can mobilize
social movements to challenge normative power structures.”).
53. On the way in which originalism shapes different parts of the conservative
movement strategy, see, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 560–68.
54. For example, as Kornbluh shows, the welfare-rights movement drew inspiration
from civil-rights advocacy, human-rights rhetoric, and political critiques of capitalism in
formulating its demands. See KORNBLUH, supra note 8, at 12, 49–50, 67, 175. For a similar
use of a variety of sources of inspiration, see Dinner, supra note 8, at 590–95.
55. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 560–61.
56. For example, conservative originalists have often refrained from using international
sources, even when doing so might have been advantageous. See, e.g., DAVID L. SLOSS,
MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, & WILLIAM S. DODGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 515 (2011).
57. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
58. Cf., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 1203 (“Social conservative voters place a high enough
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For this reason, originalism talk and rights talk have analogous
costs and benefits, particularly when movements prioritize work in
the courts. Originalist rhetoric allowed pro-lifers access to an
influential coalition. It legitimated anti-abortion demands and
framed them in a way that resonated with legal elites. At the same
time, in order to fit within an existing originalist framework,
abortion opponents had to downplay their most deeply held
constitutional commitments. Instead of building support for their
fundamental beliefs, abortion opponents turned to rhetoric that
promised an immediate political payoff.
Certainly, in the short term, irrespective of the strategy chosen,
abortion opponents would not have achieved constitutional
protection (or social support) for the fetal rights they championed.
Nonetheless, originalism talk used up resources and energy that
could have advanced activists’ efforts to reshape public attitudes
toward fetal life. Historians have not fully captured what conservative
originalism meant to its constituents. This Article recovers an
important part of this lost history.
Moreover, this Article offers new foundation for efforts to create
a progressive alternative to originalism. To create such an alternative
would in theory allow progressives to influence the courts, federal
court nominations, and popular attitudes as much as conservative
originalism. As the Article shows, however, the conservative
originalist alliance emerged at considerable cost to some of its
members. The success of originalism as a political practice depended
on the willingness of social movements to set aside important beliefs
and goals in order to forge a politically influential alliance.
II. MAKING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIVE, 1965–1981
Early anti-abortion constitutionalism could not easily be
reconciled with the jurisprudence of original intent articulated by
William Rehnquist, Robert Bork, and other first-generation
originalists. These scholars demanded fidelity to the intentions of the
framers and heavy reliance on the text of the Constitution. 59 Those

priority on the federal courts to make credible to politicians the threat that their votes could
turn on that issue.”).
59. On the history of first-generation originalism, see, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism
and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’s Home in Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997,
2003–05 (2012); Whittington, supra note 14, at 599–603.
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who would later be seen as pioneering originalists attacked the
freewheeling Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence of the 1960s
and 1970s that some commentators perceived as identifying
fundamental rights to birth control or reproductive liberty without
Anti-abortion
any
obvious
constitutional
foundation. 60
constitutionalists instead demanded that the courts recognize
another implicit right—a right to life—by relying on unconventional
legal sources. Contrary to what we might now expect of
conservatives, abortion opponents envisioned a broad role for the
judiciary and the State, and they endorsed a variety of unorthodox
interpretive methods. The anti-abortion movement followed earlier
social movements, like the antislavery campaign of the 1840s and
1850s, in turning to the Declaration of Independence to illuminate
the meaning of the Constitution. 61 Moreover, in the 1960s and
1970s, the anti-abortion movement joined the pro-choice and
welfare-rights movements, among others, in relying on an expansive
vision of substantive due process, procedural due process, or state
action. 62
In the mid-1960s, anti-abortion constitutionalists assumed that
the public would automatically support the right to life if they
understood what abortion really was. For this reason, early antiabortion constitutional theories served primarily as a vehicle for
evidence of the personhood of the fetus. Relying predominantly on
equal-protection or procedural due process reasoning, early antiabortion constitutionalism assumed the existence of a fundamental
right to life without explaining its precise constitutional foundation.
Gradually, as the abortion-rights movement made headway in the
lower courts, abortion opponents began to elaborate more fully on
their constitutional beliefs.

60. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 405, 409–10 (2d ed. 1997) (attacking the Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger Courts for discounting original intent);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 13
(1971) (arguing that Brown lacked a basis in the Fourteenth Amendment).
61. On abolitionists’ use of the Declaration of Independence, see, e.g., HENRIETTA
BUCKMASTER, LET MY PEOPLE GO: THE STORY OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD AND THE
GROWTH OF THE ABOLITION MOVEMENT 31 (1992); ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF
AMERICAN FREEDOM 86 (1999).
62. This Section later explores these parallels in greater depth.
OF THE
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A. The Creation of Anti-abortion Constitutionalism, 1965–1973
The contemporary anti-abortion movement emerged in response
to efforts to reform or repeal bans on abortion in the 1960s and
1970s. 63 Because anti-abortion organizations depended on the
conditions present in each state, groups adopted strikingly different
tactics, beliefs, and priorities. 64 The movement found itself divided
about substantive issues, like contraception and the Equal Rights
Amendment, as well as tactical questions. 65 Just the same, elite and
grassroots members of what was a fragmented movement shared
profound constitutional convictions about the existence of a right to
life. As attorneys initially framed many of the movement’s
constitutional arguments, movement lay persons and physicians
enthusiastically adopted them.
Scholars have debated the source of these convictions, whether
they stem from faith in traditionalist gender roles, subconscious
disgust, or religious commitments. 66 It is not my purpose here to
explain the origin of anti-abortion constitutional convictions. Just
the same, it is worth taking these beliefs seriously. Abortion
opponents framed their beliefs and goals in constitutional terms
before the Supreme Court intervened in the debate. 67 This

63. See, e.g., Keith Cassidy, The Right to Life Movement: Sources, Development, and
Strategies, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 139 (Donald T. Critchlow ed., 1996).
64. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 292 (1992).
65. On anti-abortion divisions about contraception and the Equal Rights Amendment,
see, e.g., Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Antiabortion Moderates After Roe v.
Wade, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 574–76, 584–90 (2012). On the movement’s tactical
divisions, see, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 63, at 138–43.
66. For an argument showing subconscious disgust motivated some abortion
opponents, see, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 409 (2013). For an explanation of the relationship between opposition to abortion and
endorsement of a traditionalist vision of gender roles, see, e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION
AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 117–18, 199–201, 205 (1984). For an argument that
some abortion opponents acted out of a sense of religious obligation, see, e.g., MICHAEL W.
CUNEO, THE SMOKE OF SATAN: CONSERVATIVE AND TRADITIONALIST DISSENT IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 64–66 (1999); Michael W. Cuneo, Life Battles:
The Rise of Catholic Militancy within the American Pro-Life Movement, in BEING RIGHT:
CONSERVATIVE CATHOLICS IN AMERICA 270–75, 284 (Mary Jo Weaver & R. Scott Appleby
eds., 1995).
67. For examples of the use of constitutional arguments in the mid-1960s, see, e.g.,
William J. Kenealy, Law and Morals, 9 CATH. LAW. 200, 201–03 (1963); Robert M. Byrn,
Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQ. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (1966) [hereinafter Abortion in
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constitutional framing began at a time when supporters of legal
abortion described their own cause as one involving public health
and population control as well as constitutional rights. 68 Moreover,
abortion opponents continued to insist on the existence of a right to
life long after it seemed possible to create any constitutional
protection for the fetus. 69 The constitutionalism of the anti-abortion
movement may reflect quite different subconscious motivations, but
movement members’ constitutional commitments have been
remarkably consistent, persistent, and passionately promoted.
As early as the mid-1960s, non-lawyers in many pro-life groups,
like many social movement members, used constitutional rhetoric to
express their shared aspirations. 70 Groups chose names that referred
to the “right to life” mentioned in the Declaration of Independence,
including the Southern California Right to Life League, New York
State Right to Life, and the Illinois Right to Life Committee. 71
Constitutional commitments defined the statements of purpose of
several major pro-life organizations, including the National Right to
Life Committee (NRLC), the largest national pro-life organization;
American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL), a moderate pro-life
group; and Americans United for Life (AUL), the group that would
form the nation’s leading pro-life public law firm. “Protecting the

Perspective]; Note, In Defense of the Right to Live: The Constitutionality of Therapeutic Abortion,
1 GA. L. REV. 693, 697–700 (1967).
68. On the turn of the abortion-rights movement to the courts and to constitutional
law in the late 1960s, see, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 335–473 (1998).
69. While there appears to be no chance for ratification in the near term, abortion
opponents continue to push for an endorsement of a fetal-rights amendment in the Republican
Party platform. See, e.g., Sean Sullivan, Republicans, Democrats spar over abortion language in
GOP platform, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/08/26/republicans-democrats-spar-over-abortion-language-ingop-platform/.
70. For an articulation of this view of movements’ use of constitutional rhetoric, see,
e.g., Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All”,
74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987). This Section later discusses at greater length pro-lifers reliance
on constitutional discourse.
71. On the naming of the Right to Life League of Southern California and New York
State Right to Life, see, e.g., Fred C. Shapiro, ‘Right to Life’ has a message for New York State
legislators, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1972, at SM10. On the early activity of the Right to Life
League of Southern California, see, e.g., Keith Monroe, How California’s Abortion Law Isn’t
Working, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1968, at SM10. On the founding of the Illinois Right to Life
Committee, see, e.g., SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT:
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 35 (1991).
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right to life of the unborn child,” the NRLC Statement of Purpose
asserted, “is a central issue to the National Right to Life
Committee.” 72 A strategy memo drafted by ACCL leaders William
Hunt and Joseph Lampe argued: “Our fundamental legal documents
list life as an unalienable right.” 73 The AUL’s Declaration of Purpose
similarly explained:
We believe, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, that
“all men are created equal”; and thus that to be true to its heritage,
this nation must guarantee to the least and most disadvantaged
among us an equal share in the right to life. 74

The anti-abortion movement emphasized constitutional
arguments before the opposition did so. The movement to repeal
bans on abortion made progress in state legislatures in the early
1960s, with Colorado, California, Maryland, North Carolina, and
Georgia loosening bans on abortion before 1969. 75 In promoting
these laws, abortion-rights advocates framed abortion as both an
important medical procedure and the solution to an epidemic of
botched, back-alley procedures. 76 Supporters of reform laws like the
one in Colorado emphasized that abortion “was strictly a health
matter.” 77
In the 1960s, abortion opponents began to argue that these
reform laws violated the Constitution. The attorneys who framed
these constitutional claims played a vital role in the development of
the movement. In the early years of its existence, movement
leadership was surprisingly egalitarian, putting professionals and
blue-collar activists, and men and women, in positions of equal

72. Statement of Purpose from National Right to Life Committee (1972) (on file with
the Gerald Ford Memorial Library, Univer. of Mich., The American Citizens Concerned for
Life Papers, Box 4).
73. Memorandum from William C. Hunt & Joseph A. Lampe on Strategy
Considerations for ACCL Involvement in Abortion and Related Issues 1–5 (1974), (on file
with the Gerald Ford Memorial Library, Univer. of Mich., The American Citizens Concerned
for Life Papers, Box 15).
74. Declaration of Purpose from Americans United for Life, (1971), (on file with the
Concordia Seminary, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, St. Louis, Missouri, the Executive File).
75. See, e.g., RAYMOND TATALOVICH, THE POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 38 (1997).
76. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, The Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and the
Changing Debate on Abortion Law, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 281, 282 (2009).
77. GARROW, supra note 68, at 324.
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authority. 78 Attorneys were among the movement’s leadership, but
their influence reached beyond the formal role they played in the
hierarchy. These lawyers formulated constitutional arguments that
were to become the centerpiece of movement commitments, and
attorneys helped to develop the legal strategies the movement would
pursue both before and after Roe.
For example, Thomas L. Shaffer, a professor at Notre Dame,
argued that abortion reform deprived the fetus of life without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. “If human
life is involved, though, [in abortion],” Shaffer explained, “its
destruction is a relatively grave matter. Abortion should at least, in
that case, be surrounded with procedural protections as great as
those given men convicted of [a] crime . . . .” 79
While insisting that legal abortion violated the rights of the fetus,
abortion opponents generally attributed liberalization bills to public
ignorance about the nature of fetal personhood. As Shaffer
explained: “the decision . . . to leave the life or death of unborn
children in the hands of physicians and pregnant women [has]
come . . . with too little consideration of the possibility that
[abortion] involves millions of human lives.” 80
In the mid-1960s, anti-abortion activists viewed constitutional
arguments as a way of popularizing their views about the fetus. In a
1965 article, Robert Byrn, a professor at Fordham School of Law,
summarized a common view of the movement’s mission: “The task,
then, is to bring the public to a realization of the fact that pre-natal
life is innocent human life and, like all such life, is inherently
sacred.” 81 By the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court had already
developed an equal-protection jurisprudence targeting discrimination
78. For example, New York State Right to Life counted among its leaders a law
professor, a construction worker, and a homemaker. See Shapiro, supra note 71, at SM10, SM
34. Other state organizations, like Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, had a similarly
diverse leadership, including supporters of family planning like Frederick Mecklenburg, an
obstetrician-gynecologist, and his wife, Marjory, a home economics teacher and mother. See,
e.g., Pennsylvanians Concerned for Life, “Biographies of Persons Attending Conference of
National Importance in Right to Life Work” (n. d., c. 1972), in THE AMERICAN CITIZENS
CONCERNED FOR LIFE PAPERS, BOX 4, 1972 NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE CONVENTION FILE.
See also DONALD CRITCHLOW, INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: BIRTH CONTROL, ABORTION,
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 137–38 (1999).
79. Thomas L. Shaffer, Abortion, the Law, and Human Life, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 94, 106
(1967–1968).
80. Id. at 95.
81. Byrn, supra note 67, at 322.
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on the basis of race and national origin. 82 The Court treated laws
that classified on these bases as inherently suspect and subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny. 83 An equal-protection argument used by
anti-abortion activists compared fetuses to other discrete and insular
minorities—fetuses were defenseless, subject to discrimination (in the
form of abortion), and defined by a trait (age or residence in the
womb) over which they had no control. 84
In the 1960s, however, equal-protection claims worked primarily
as a way to showcase the personhood of the fetus. Anti-abortion
constitutionalists developed two central and interrelated definitions
of personhood, based respectively on law and biology: “The progress
of the law in the recognition of the fetus as a human person for all
purposes has been strong and clearly and roughly proportional to the
growth of knowledge of biology and embryology.” 85
Legal definitions drew on property, criminal law, and tort
precedents, in order to show that the law had already determined the
fetus to be a person or was well on its way to doing so. 86 Medical
contentions, by contrast, worked to persuade legislators and
members of the public that “the unborn child [would] qualify as a
person within the purview” of the Fourteenth Amendment. 87
Activists defined personhood partly as a matter of individuality,
wholeness, and uniqueness. Science could demonstrate “factually
that abortion destroys an individuated and unique human life.” 88
“Medical knowledge,” the argument went, “has progressed to such
an extent that we now know that an embryo contains all the

82. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1996) (observing that “heightened
scrutiny” applies to classifications involving sex, race, and ancestry); Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (reconstructing how social movement conflict shaped
modern understandings of discrimination on account of race).
83. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 628–29.
84. See Abortion in Perspective, supra note 67, at 134. See also Robert Byrn, Abortion on
Demand: Whose Morality, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 26–27 (1970–71) [hereinafter Abortion
on Demand].
85. David Louisell, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA
L. REV. 233, 234 (1968–1969).
86. See, e.g., id. at 235–44; Abortion in Perspective, supra note 67, at 129; A. James
Quinn & James A. Griffin, The Rights of the Unborn, 3 JURIST 577, 578 (1971); Note, The
Unborn Child and the Constitutional Conception of Life, 56 IOWA L. REV. 994, 997–1003
(1970–1971) [hereinafter The Unborn Child].
87. See The Unborn Child, supra note 86, at 996.
88. Byrn, supra note 84, at 16.
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fundamental material necessary for the development and growth of
every organ, system, and part of the human body.” 89
Equal protection arguments offered one strategy for dramatizing
these understandings of personhood. As one pro-life attorney
explained, the Equal Protection Clause “applies only to persons.” 90
Litigating abortion cases would show that “the unborn child is a
human being and it is difficult to conceive of a human being who is
not a person.” 91
In the late 1960s, Berkeley Law School Professor David Louisell
offered an alternative technique for dramatizing fetal personhood.
Like other anti-abortion scholars, Louisell assumed that the
Constitution protected a fundamental right to life but did not
explain its origin. 92 His focus was on the procedural protections due
to a fetus before an abortion was performed. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, persons could not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. 93 That abortion ended a life
was obvious to Louisell. 94 A procedural due process claim, in turn,
allowed pro-life attorneys to argue for fetal personhood. The process
due to these persons, Louisell suggested, might involve the
appointment of a guardian ad litem: “Appointment of a guardian [ad
litem] to represent the fetus would seem feasible and would be the
minimum starting point for any attempt at due process . . . .” 95
By the early 1970s, the movement had developed an argument
comparing abortion to the imprisonment or death sentence facing
convicted criminals. Before the State could take a life, the argument
went, the government had an obligation to appoint a guardian ad
litem or provide other adequate procedural protections. Antiabortion activists’ work mirrored the strategy of progressive social
movements using procedural due process to change the
understanding of what counted as a right (or a rights-holding
individual). As the welfare-rights movement deployed procedural
due process to build protection for “new property,” such as welfare

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

890

Quinn & Griffin, supra note 87, at 577.
Abortion in Perspective, supra note 67, at 134.
Id.
See Louisell, supra note 85, at 248.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See Louisell, supra note 85, at 246.
Id. at 251.
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benefits, the anti-abortion movement used procedural due process in
an effort to change the constitutional status of the fetus. 96
The procedural due-process strategy immediately attracted the
interest of the NRLC. In a 1970 legal report, NRLC attorney
Martin McKernan explained:
All in all, the law has consistently established certain procedural
safeguards and fundamental rights to which the unborn was
entitled. The most fundamental of rights—not to be deprived of
life without due process—cannot be ignored. However, these
arguments must be demonstrated to any court [. . .] through the
intervention of interested state right-to-life groups. In one federal
court challenge to a state abortion statute a doctor was allowed to
enter the case as an intervenor on behalf of all unborn children in
that state. This enabled attorneys to offer testimony [. . .] and call
witnesses. 97

McKernan suggested that a guardian ad litem could literally and
figuratively represent the fetus, bringing forth evidence of fetal
uniqueness, pain, and humanity. 98 The guardian could make both
due-process and equal-protection arguments while demonstrating
that the fetus was as human as anyone sitting in the courtroom.
As McKernan’s argument suggested, many leading abortion
opponents assumed that the Constitution already protected fetal
rights, and movement leaders prioritized constitutional strategies
based on this assumption. While some abortion opponents, like
future Attorney General and Senator John Ashcroft, called for the
introduction of a constitutional amendment protecting fetal life as
early as 1972, 99 most movement members followed McKernan in
insisting that the Constitution already protected fetal rights.

96. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For cases
considering innovative definitions of property in a procedural due process setting, see, e.g.,
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1978) (gas and electric
services); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573–74 (1975) (public school attendance); Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972) (government employment); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (welfare benefits).
97. Martin McKernan, Legal Report: Court Cases (July 1972) (The NRLC Papers, Box
4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, Univer. of Mich.).
98. See id.
99. See 144 CONG. REC. S5694-06 (1998). Indeed, the National Committee for a
Human Life Amendment, Inc., an organization dedicated to the passage of the human life
amendment, did not form until after Roe. See Robert Lynch, The National Committee for a
Human Life Amendment: Its Goals and Origins, 20 CATH. LAW. 303, 304–06 (1974).
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Before Roe, Byrn and New York State Right to Life tested out
the strategy that Louisell and McKernan proposed. Those attracted
to this strategy proved to be diverse, including blue-collar workers
and homemakers as well as attorneys. 100 Members tended to be white
residents of rural or suburban neighborhoods, most of whom were
over thirty years old. 101 The New York Times described these activists
as “average, middle-class ladies and gentlemen.” 102 As was the case
with many anti-abortion organizations before Roe, New York State
Right to Life counted lawyers and doctors among its members 103 but
took some time to develop a sophisticated political or legal
strategy. 104 In the first several years of its existence, the organization
functioned primarily as a “letter-writing operation,” seeking to
educate legislators and voters about what activists saw as the
personhood of the fetus. 105 Over time, activists realized that they
would have to promote their views in the legislature and the courts
more actively. As part of this effort, these activists framed their goals
in more explicitly constitutional terms, taking their organization’s
name from the right to life mentioned in “the Declaration of
Independence and . . . the United States Declaration of Human
Rights . . . .”106
After New York had repealed all restrictions on abortion access,
New York State Right to Life also pursued litigation to advance its
view of fetal rights. Byrn petitioned to be named guardian ad litem
for all of the unborn children scheduled to be aborted in city
hospitals. 107 The case he brought, Byrn v. New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation, allowed his attorneys to speak for these
fetuses, insisting that “‘hundreds of [their] clients [would] be

100. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 71, at SM10, SM34.
101. See, e.g., id. at SM10.
102. Id. On the role of professionals in early anti-abortion organizations, see, e.g.,
LUKER, supra note 66, at 68–72, 145–46 (1984). By contrast, Ziad Munson’s recent work
stresses the importance of relational ties in the mobilization of anti-abortion activists. See ZIAD
MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION
WORKS 52–53 (2010).
103. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 71, at SM10, SM34.
104. See, e.g., id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Robert Tomasson, A Lawyer Challenges the Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
1971, at 29.
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murdered’” unless the court intervened. 108 As guardian ad litem,
Byrn argued that the scheduled abortions violated fetal rights to
equal protection and due process of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 109 In January 1972, the trial court granted Byrn’s
petition and issued an injunction preventing abortions in city
hospitals. 110 The move seemed to signal that biological assertions of
personhood were working. The court reasoned:
Credence must, therefore, be given to testimony given in affidavit
form by plaintiff from accredited scientists that an unborn human
infant has a pulsating human heart; that at that stage of
development the child’s brain, spinal cord and nervous system has
been established and that, as medical fact, the fetus is a living
human being. 111

However, the opinions of both the Appellate Division and the
New York Court of Appeals called into question the wisdom of the
existing, science-based strategy. In both instances, the courts
assumed that biological evidence demonstrated the personhood of
the fetus:
It is not effectively contradicted, if it was contradicted at all, that
modern biological disciplines accept that upon conception a fetus
has an independent genetic “package” with the potential to
become a full-fledged human being and that it has an autonomy of
development and character. 112

However, biological evidence did not determine legal
personhood, for personhood was “a policy question which in most
instances devolves upon the Legislature.” 113
The outcome of Byrn reflected a strategy devised by abortionrights activists like Larry Lader and Garrett Hardin: the influence of
contentions that the question of personhood depended on inherently
subjective, often religious beliefs. As part of this strategy, in a 1968

108. Order Is Sought in Abortion Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1971, at 32.
109. See id.
110. Murray Schumach, Judge Acts to Stay Abortions in Municipal Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1972, at A1.
111. Id.
112. Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 888 (N.Y. 1972). See
also Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 A.D.2d 316, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972)
(assessing uncontested medical affidavits concerning fetal personhood).
113. Byrn, 286 N.E.2d at 889. See also Byrn, 38 A.D.2d at 326–31.
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article published in the Journal of Marriage and Family, Hardin
argued that medicine or science did not establish the meaning of
fetal personhood. 114 Personhood, Hardin argued, was “a matter of
definition, not fact; and we can define [it] any way we wish.” 115
Following a major television debate on abortion, Lader similarly
advised pro-choice activists:
Have all your facts and material prepared on the issue of potential
life versus a human person . . . Put your opponents on the
defensive—their view of the human person represents a minority,
religious view. It has no medical credence. They don’t have the
right to force the majority to think as they do. 116

The Byrn litigation suggested that the liberalization of abortion
laws in the legislatures and courts depended on more than public
ignorance about what the fetus was. Courts that assumed the truth
of the anti-abortion movement’s biological assertions nonetheless
concluded that fetuses had no constitutional rights. Consider, for
example, the outcome of litigation in Doe v. Scott, a case concerning
the constitutionality of an Illinois abortion ban. 117 Anti-abortion
activists in Illinois, including Chicago attorney Dennis Horan and
physician Brent Heffernan, used Doe as an opportunity to put on
display their own arguments for personhood. Horan explained to the
press that law in the state “recognizes that the unborn child has
constitutional rights the same as any other individual.” 118 He viewed
court decisions to appoint a guardian ad litem as the first step in the
achievement of “complete protection of the child from the
beginning of its life.” 119
In spite of Horan and Heffernan’s best efforts, the Illinois
District Court questioned whether the State’s interest truly involved
fetal life at all since the government had ignored any concern about
the quality of life and forced “the birth of every fetus, no matter how
defective or how intensely unwanted by its parents.” 120 Even if the
114. Garret Hardin, Abortion—or Compulsory Pregnancy?, 30 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 246
(1968).
115. Id. at 250.
116. Strategy Memorandum, Larry Lader to NARAL Board Members et al. (Fall 1972)
(The NARAL Papers, MC 313, Carton 8, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Univer.).
117. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
118. Abortion Foes Begin To Fight, CHI. DEF., Feb. 13, 1971, at 21.
119. Id.
120. Doe, 321 F. Supp. at 1391.
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fetus did have any constitutional interest, the court concluded, the
“countervailing rights of pregnant women” trumped those
interests. 121 In other instances, the courts rejected biological
personhood claims altogether. Abele v. Markle, a Connecticut
opinion, suggested that the biological evidence was at best unclear.
Instead, personhood was a matter of religious belief: an effort to
“impose [. . .] uniformity of thought” upon the woman and the
abortion provider. 122
The setbacks of the late 1960s and early 1970s made clear that
the movement would have to do more to demonstrate the existence
of a right to life. These initial failures would later push anti-abortion
activists toward a sometimes costly originalist strategy. In the short
term, however, movement members sought to identify a more
effective way of arguing for a right to life—one based on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Anti-abortion law
review articles began contending that “[a]lthough the Constitution
contains no express reference to the right to life,” the Declaration of
Independence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and international law
protected that right. 123 Byrn summarized one argument of this kind:
The Declaration of Independence holds as self-evident the moral
truths “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The fourteenth
amendment institutionalized these principles [. . .] in the
Constitution. 124

By the 1970s, when Byrn was writing, scholars like Robert Bork
and Raoul Berger had already begun to develop an interpretive
theory that later came to be known as originalism. 125 Since these
theorists privileged adherence to the intentions of the Framers of the
Constitution, Bork and Berger urged judges to look only to the text
and history of the Constitution itself. 126 Scholars like Rehnquist and
Bork expressed particular skepticism about the Supreme Court’s
121. Id.
122. 351 F. Supp. 224, 231 (D. Conn. 1972).
123. The Unborn Child, supra note 86, at 1004; see also Abortion in Perspective, supra
note 67, at 128; In Defense of the Right to Live, supra note 67, at 697; Quinn & Griffin, supra
note 86, at 579.
124. Abortion on Demand, supra note 84, at 19.
125. See, e.g., Strang, supra note 59, at 2003–05; Whittington, supra note 14, at 601–03.
126. See, e.g., Strang, supra note 59, at 2003–05; Whittington, supra note 14, at 601–03.
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recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 127 In opinions like
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court had recognized the existence of a
fundamental right to privacy that was at most implicit in the
constitutional text. 128 For anyone guided by a jurisprudence of
“original intent,” these opinions appeared result-oriented,
unprincipled, and incoherent.
For their part, Byrn and anti-abortion attorneys strongly believed
that the Constitution protected fundamental, Fourteenth
Amendment rights that did not appear in the text of the
Constitution, and they often insisted that courts use unconventional
legal sources in identifying the existence of such rights. The National
Conference of Catholic Bishops relied on not only the Declaration of
Independence, but also on natural law, as a source of the right to
life: “The basic human rights guaranteed by our American laws are,
therefore, unalienable because their source is not man-made
legislation but the Creator of all mankind.” 129
For the most part, however, abortion opponents developed a
secular theory of constitutional rights that drew on reasoning similar
to the Griswold Court’s. According to this theory, courts should
endeavor to identify fundamental rights not spelled out in the text of
the Constitution. Representing the AUL, Dennis Horan and his
colleagues argued in 1976:
John Locke, whose influence on the thinking of the founders of this
nation is well known, wrote in his Second Treatise of Civil Government
of the natural rights to life and property. These basic ideas found their
way into the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 . . . . In
speaking of the first official action of this nation, which declared the
foundation of our government in those words, the United States
Supreme Court has said that ‘. . . it is always safe to read the letter of the
[C]onstitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.’ . . .
[T]he importance of the right to life in modern political and social
theory has remained nearly unscathed as is evidenced not only by the
Fourth Article of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . but
also by the Second Article of the European Human Rights
Convention, and the movement to abolish capital punishment.130

127. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 60, at 409–10; Bork, supra note 60, at 13–14.
128. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
129. Statements of National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 19 CATH. LAW. 29, 30 (1973).
130. Motion and Brief for Dr. Eugene Diamond and Americans United for Life, Inc. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 35–36, Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
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The reliance on unconventional legal sources—particularly the
Declaration of Independence and international law—distinguished
anti-abortion constitutionalism from an emerging jurisprudence of
original intent. Abortion opponents also endorsed a different vision
of the judicial role, at times explicitly approving of the interpretive
method used in substantive due process decisions like Griswold. As
late as 1976, an amicus brief submitted by the United States
Catholic Conference set forth this view:
The granting of legal personhood . . . is, we submit, properly the
product of a constitutionalanalysis [sic] which recognizes the
existence of rights which must be said to be implicit in other, more
explicitlyprotectedrights [sic] . . . . The process used to reach the
penumbral rights enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut is the selfsame recognition of necessary implication. . . . It is ironic that the
majority in Roe not only failed to use the penumbral process
with respect to fetal life, but also misapplied it with respect to the
pregnant woman. 131

Anti-abortion use of Griswold and other substantive-due process
reasoning seems surprising in light of contemporary criticisms by
abortion opponents and conservatives of judicial overreaching. In the
early 1970s, however, abortion opponents wanted to build on
existing substantive due process jurisprudence in order to establish
the existence of a fundamental right to life rooted in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, before Roe, it was supporters of abortion rights
who benefitted from concerns about judicial overreaching. In Byrn,
for example, deference to the will of popular majorities convinced
the courts to reject a claim of constitutional fetal rights: “[T]his
court is not required to weigh and choose between the competing
values urged by those who support the [abortion repeal] law and
those who oppose it. The Legislature has made that
determination . . . .” 132

Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419), 1976 WL 178721 (citations
omitted).
131. Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 16–17, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419); cf. Robert Byrn, Which Way for Judicial Imperialism, 4 HUM. LIFE
REV. 19 (1977) (arguing for neutrality on the question of judicial restraint or judicial
activism); Harold O. J. Brown, What Makes the Law the Law, 4 HUM. LIFE REV. 68, 68–73
(Fall 1978) (endorsing a natural law interpretation of the Constitution).
132. Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 A.D.2d 316, 331 (1972).
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B. Roe v. Wade, Constitutional Amendments, and the Quest for
Perfection
At least at first, Roe v. Wade reinforced movement members’
interest in an implied-rights theory of constitutional interpretation.
Initially, as we shall see, anti-abortion activists rallied around a
proposed fetal-life amendment to the Constitution—a campaign to
forever entrench the movement’s beliefs in the Constitution. During
this struggle, abortion opponents continued to elaborate on the
constitutional theory that they developed before Roe. This theory
stood in tension with interpretive theories centered on the idea of
original intent. In particular, abortion opponents expressly rejected
any amendment that would return the abortion question to
democratic politics—the result in Roe that first-generation originalist
jurists would later endorse. 133
The campaign for a perfect constitutional amendment began
with the startling defeat the movement suffered in Roe. 134 Roe and its
companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 135 struck down the abortion laws
applicable in forty-six states. 136 As importantly, Roe rejected antiabortion arguments about fetal personhood. The Court made clear
that it would “not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins.” 137 Read against the backdrop of movement conflict in the
period, however, Roe did take sides on this question, adopting the
view that fetal personhood was a matter of individual belief. 138 In
support of this conclusion, the Court stressed that “those trained in
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology
[were] unable to arrive at any consensus . . . .” 139
The Court went further, questioning the value of medical
evidence suggesting that life began at conception. “Substantial
problems [with] this view are posed,” Roe explained, “by new
embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a
‘process’ . . . rather than an event, and by new medical techniques
133. On the belief that originalists would overrule Roe, see, e.g., Joan Williams, Abortion,
Incommensurability, and Jurisprudence, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1651, 1660 (1989).
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
136. See Richard Pildes, Is The Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP.
CT. REV. 103, 150–51.
137. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
138. See id.
139. Id.
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such as menstrual extraction [and] the morning after pill . . . .” 140
The opinion treated personhood as a question of individual belief
while insisting that medical evidence factually undermined a
conclusion that life began at conception.
Roe made clear that biological evidence of fetal personhood
would not establish the constitutional protection movement
members desired. The Court had questioned the validity of the
biological evidence on which abortion opponents so often relied.
More importantly, Roe treated biological assertions as irrelevant,
since personhood was truly a matter of individual conscience and
subjective belief.
However, Roe did not convince abortion opponents to abandon
their ambitious constitutional agenda. Far from setting aside
arguments for a right to life, abortion opponents prioritized a
constitutional amendment that would perfectly capture their beliefs,
restoring what abortion opponents viewed as a longstanding
constitutional tradition of protecting fetal life. 141 The push for an
anti-abortion amendment began in February 1973, when many of
the nation’s leading activists gathered to discuss post-Roe strategy. 142
Those present focused on the creation of a constitutional
amendment that would reflect the movement’s foundational
commitments, passing a resolution that stated: “State Right to Life
groups and people pro-life everywhere unanimously support an effort
to bring about an amendment to the United States Constitution that
would guarantee the right to life for all humans.” 143
In Congress, two fetal-life amendments were in circulation. The
Buckley Amendment, proposed by Senator James Buckley
(Conservative–NY), provided that: “With respect to the right to life,
the word ‘person’ . . . applies to all human beings, including their
unborn offspring at every stage of . . . development . . . .”144 An
alternative proposed by Representative Larry Hogan (R–MD) stated:

140. Id. at 161.
141. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 63, at 144.
142. See Meeting Minutes, NRLC Ad Hoc Strategy Meeting (Feb. 11, 1973) (The
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library,
University of Michigan).
143. Id. at 7.
144. Nat’l Comm. for a Human Life Amend., Human Life Amendment: Major Texts 1,
available at http://www.nchla.org/datasource/idocuments/HLAmajortexts.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2013).
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“Neither the United States nor any State shall deprive any human
being, from the moment of conception, of life without due process
of law . . . .” 145
Leading anti-abortion academics worried that neither proposal
would fully protect fetal rights. For example, abortion opponent
Joseph Witherspoon, a professor at the University of Texas,
concluded that the Hogan Amendment’s vague reference to “the
moment of conception” would open the door to Supreme Court
interpretations permitting abortion in the first month of
pregnancy. 146 For Witherspoon, the Buckley Amendment appeared
clearer insofar as it protected fetuses “at any stage of biological
development,” regardless of what the Justices believed “conception”
to mean. 147 As importantly, the Buckley Amendment more clearly
asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment had already protected fetal
rights before Roe came down. 148 By contrast, Dennis Horan, a
professor at the University of Chicago and leading anti-abortion
litigator, argued that the Buckley Amendment did not include strong
enough “actuating language,” “merely re-defin[ing] the word
‘person’” and leaving too much about the Amendment’s application
open to reinterpretation. 149 On the other hand, Horan thought that
judges could read the Hogan Amendment to allow for certain legal
abortions—a problem many activists hoped to avoid. 150
Generally, movement members found neither proposal fully
satisfactory. As attorney Nellie Gray explained in attacking the
existing proposals: “Now is not the time, if ever there is a time, for
compromise.” 151 Movement members demanded an amendment that
perfectly reflected their legal convictions. In framing an ideal

145. Id. at 3.
146. See, e.g., Memorandum, Joseph Witherspoon to the Nat’l Right to Life Comm.
Exec. Comm. 2–3 (Aug. 14, 1973) (The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4,
Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Memorandum, Dennis Horan to Nat’l Right to Life Comm. Policy Comm. 2–3
(Sep. 5, 1973) (The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, Gerald Ford
Memorial Library, University of Michigan) (finding that “more technical problems with the
Buckley Amendment than with the Hogan Amendment would be incurred”).
150. Id.
151. Nellie Gray to NRLC Legal Advisory Committee (Sep. 24, 1973) (The American
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of
Michigan).
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amendment, the NRLC polled a variety of anti-abortion attorneys
and law professors. 152 The ensuing dialogue made clear that
unorthodox and complicated views defined anti-abortion
constitutionalism. Many of the attorneys polled demanded that a
fetal-life amendment ban private as well as state action—something
that neither congressional proposal did. 153 In constitutional law, the
state-action doctrine provides that only government actors’
violations of the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment are
actionable. The state-action doctrine had its fair share of critics, but
its persistence stemmed from approval of limited state power to
interfere with private beliefs or behaviors. 154 Abortion opponents
endorsed a much broader view of state power. “We felt that we had
to go to the same parameters as the U.S. Supreme Court did,”
Horan explained on behalf of the group of attorneys. “[S]ince they
allowed private destruction of the unborn the amendment should
explicitly prohibit private destruction of the unborn.” 155 In
contemporary politics, conservatives often favor use of the state
action doctrine as a way of limiting government interference with
private action. 156 In the 1970s, however, abortion opponents
adopted a view of state action doctrine that more closely resembled
the arguments made by liberal constitutional theorists today. 157
152. Dennis Horan to NRLC Board of Directors 1 (Jan. 19, 1974) (The American
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of
Michigan).
153. See id.at 2.
154. See, e.g., Lilian BeVier and John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics,
96 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2010) (summarizing criticisms of the doctrine and offering a defense of
its merits).
155. Horan to NRLC Board of Directors, supra note 152, at 2.
156. See, e.g., Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 35 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 273 (2010) (analyzing the common view that proponents of a restrictive state action
doctrine tend to be ideological conservatives); James Potter, Comment, The NCAA as State
Actor: Tarkanian, Brentwood, and Due Process, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1269, 1295 (2007)
(suggesting that “if conservative ideology does dominate the Court,” then the justices will
more likely adopt “a more restrictive state action doctrine”); Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action
Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1383–84 (2006)
(describing the conservative view of state action doctrine as a “barrier to governmental control
of private parties”).
157. For progressive arguments for a broad understanding of state action, see, e.g., LOUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 68–69 (1996);.Liliya Abramchayev, A Social Contract Argument for
the State’s Duty to Protect from Private Violence, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 849,
863 (2004) (“State action is pervasive and its traces can be found in the background of any
situation”); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO.
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The group of attorneys wished not only to ban virtually all
abortions, but also to clearly establish the existence of a right to
life—something that existing proposals supposedly failed to do. In a
March 1974 press release, the NRLC explained: “The proposed
amendment is designed principally to deal with the constitutional
guarantee of the civil right of unborn children which was destroyed
by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.” 158
Activists prioritized the advancement of a fundamental,
Fourteenth Amendment right to life and generally opposed
alternative proposals designed primarily to curb judicial
overreaching. Indeed, when Congress considered various
amendments that would overturn Roe and return the abortion issue
to democratic politics, leading activists like Byrn came out in
opposition. 159 Because these proposals would not ban abortion in
every state, they seemed more likely to succeed than did more
absolutist personhood amendments, which some observers believed
would also criminalize certain forms of contraception. 160
Nonetheless, Byrn and the larger anti-abortion movement
opposed a states’ rights amendment. He argued that such a proposal
contradicted anti-abortion constitutional commitments. He
explained: “A States Rights Amendment, in effect, recognizes that an
unborn child is a human being, but denies that the child has a
fundamental right to live.” 161 Offering similar objections, attorneys
polled by the NRLC uniformly rejected a states-rights proposal. 162
The goal, it seemed, was the establishment of a fundamental right,
not merely the overruling of Roe.
L.J. 779, 789 (2004) (“There is no region of social life that even conceptually can be marked
off as ‘private’ and free from governmental regulation.”); Cass Sunstein, State Action Is Always
Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 465 (2002).
158. Press Release, NRLC, (Mar. 14, 1974) (on file with The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers, Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
159. See Nat’l Comm. for a Human Life Amend., supra note 144.
160. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 163–66 (1992)
(discussing the advantages of one such states-rights approach considered in 1980).
161. Robert Byrn, A Human Life Amendment: What Would It Mean? HUM. LIFE REV.
50, 51–52 (1975) (arguing that a majority of anti-abortion activists opposed a states-rights
amendment). Some abortion opponents did endorse a states-rights amendment. See, e.g.,
Abortion I: Hearing on S. 119 and S. 130 Before the Subcomm. on Const’l Amendments of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong. 354 (1974) (statement of Paul Ramsey); Abortion Part I:
Hearing on S. 119 and S. 130 Before the Subcomm. on Const’l Amends. of the S. Judiciary
Comm., 93d Cong. 164–66 (1974) (statement of David Louisell).
162. Horan to NRLC Board of Directors, supra note 152.
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On the surface, the amendment strategy seemed to acknowledge
that the Constitution did not already protect a right to life. For
movement members, however, the amendment represented a chance
to legitimate claims that the Constitution—and the Fourteenth
Amendment in particular—had always recognized that right. As antiabortion activists explained, they wished not to create, but rather to
“restore to unborn children of human parents the constitutional
status and protection of persons with respect to their right to life.” 163
According to anti-abortion attorneys, the right to life emerged most
clearly “during the nineteenth century, with the increased sensitivity
to individual human values which is illustrated by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.” 164 March for Life, a new
organization founded in 1974 by Nellie Gray, spread a similar
message. “I believe in the right to privacy and certainly the right of
each human being—male and female—to control one’s own body,”
a March for Life brochure explained. 165 But “when man and woman
have participated in the creation of another human being . . . their
control over their bodies and demand for conveniences must be
subordinated at least to the right to life of their child.” 166
Between 1974 and 1979, anti-abortion constitutionalists
continued to develop a complicated constitutional agenda. Activists
argued that the right to life derived from the Declaration of
Independence. The values shaping that document became part of the
fabric of the Fourteenth Amendment and of international human
rights law. Ideally, this right to life would be protected—whether by
the courts or by a constitutional amendment—from the democratic
process.
This constitutional vision had tremendous power for its
proponents. Even as the prospects for ratification of a human life
amendment dimmed, anti-abortion constitutionalists continued to
prioritize it. Gradually, however, other movement members made
progress in narrowing the Court’s interpretation of Roe. The
movement’s litigation successes brought to the surface questions
about the movement’s legal priorities. Did abortion opponents wish
163. Press Release, NRLC, supra note 158, at 2.
164. Id.
165. Press Release, The National March for Life Committee (Jan. 22, 1974) (on file
with The American Citizens Concern for Life Papers at the Gerald Ford Memorial Library at
the University of Michigan).
166. Id.
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primarily to defend a cherished set of constitutional values, or did
they wish to make an immediate impact on the number of abortions
performed? The process of answering this question was long and
difficult, ultimately bringing abortion opponents into the originalist
coalition.
C. Redefining Roe, 1976–1981
For anti-abortion constitutionalists, prospects in the Supreme
Court seemed bleak in the mid-1970s. Nonetheless, Horan and the
AUL continued to participate in amicus advocacy. The AUL’s
influence was evident in a series of cases on state-level bans on the
public funding of abortion: Maher v. Roe, Poelker v. Doe, and Beal v.
Doe. 167 These laws had fared badly in the lower courts. In Maher, the
district court had struck down a public-funding ban. 168 Under the
Equal Protection Clause, the court held, the State could not choose
to fund childbirth but not abortion, since abortion itself was a
fundamental right. 169
AUL attorneys responded that the abortion right in Roe simply
did not apply in funding cases. 170 Roe protected only a freedom from
state interference. By contrast, in a brief submitted in Poelker, a case
on the constitutionality of a policy prohibiting all abortions in city
hospitals, the AUL contended that “the abortional act [. . .] enjoys
no constitutional protection in itself.” 171 By extension, the AUL brief
asserted, physicians in public facilities could, under Roe,
constitutionally refuse to perform abortion. As the brief framed it,
Roe recognized a right belonging to a “woman in consultation with
her physician, not demanding of her physician.” 172
A second and ultimately more successful argument explored the
idea that abortion rights protected only a woman’s privacy. The
definition of abortion as a privacy right did not necessarily foreclose a
constitutional demand for government support, as many district

167. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
168. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663–64 (D. Conn. 1975).
169. See id.
170. See Brief for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (No. 75-442).
171. Id. at 15.
172. Id.
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courts in the mid-1970s had concluded. 173 Nonetheless, the AUL
managed to frame privacy rights as incompatible with any
requirement of government support or participation. As the AUL
LDEF brief explained: “If the abortion decision is so private [. . .] it
follows that government shall not itself be compelled to respond to
the demand of the exercise of that right.” 174 Under Roe, the state
could not interfere with a woman’s decision making but had no
obligation to fund abortion. 175
The Maher Court adopted reasoning that reflected the claims
made by abortion opponents and attorneys representing the states
defending the laws. The Court explained that Roe “did not declare
an unqualified constitutional right to an abortion.” 176 Instead, Roe
merely protected “the woman from unduly burdensome interference
with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.” 177
For this reason, the State was free to “make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment
by the allocation of public funds.” 178
In 1980, in Harris v. McRae, the Court upheld the Hyde
Amendment, a federal ban on the Medicaid funding of abortion. 179
Horan and his colleagues believed that Harris marked an important
change in the abortion debate:
Under Harris, the Constitution would not be violated even if, so
long as the woman’s choice of abortion is not directly interdicted,
she is effectively surrounded . . . by public pressure and
inducements to abandon her decision to abort. This situation is far
from the socially respectable status that would make abortion on
demand sociologically, psychologically, and politically secure. 180

173. See, e.g., Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1975) (same) (holding that a
funding ban violated the Equal Protection Clause since the State could not choose to fund
childbirth while denying funding for the fundamental abortion right); Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 1975) (same); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975) (same);
Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chi. Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974) (same); Doe
v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974) (same); Doe v. Rose, 49 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir.
1974) (same).
174. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 170, at 15.
175. See id.
176. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 474.
179. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
180. Dennis Horan & Thomas Marzen, The Supreme Court on Abortion Funding: The
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Horan also believed it to be significant that the Court had
sanctioned legislatures’ interest in protecting fetal life. 181 As activists
like Horan saw it, opinions like Harris might pave the way for the
overruling of Roe. Decisions like Maher and Harris recognized a
more expansive and legitimate state interest in fetal life. Significantly,
Maher and Harris also narrowed the scope of the abortion right,
giving legislators more latitude in regulating the procedure.
Abortion opponents’ success in Maher and Harris stood in sharp
contrast to the fate of fetal-life amendments, none of which had
made significant progress. 182 These cases showed that anti-abortion
activists could make progress in reinterpreting Roe rather than in
promoting a fundamental right to life. Just the same, narrowing Roe
fell short of the constitutional goals the movement had set. At most,
the Court appeared willing to uphold restrictions that would reduce
access to abortion. 183 The Justices took as a given that the
Constitution protected a right to abortion, and nothing in abortion
jurisprudence hinted at the existence of a constitutional right to life.
Abortion opponents certainly welcomed any opinion that would
make it harder to get an abortion, but their priority remained the
ratification of an amendment protecting the right to life. 184
The AUL’s experience revealed an underlying tension in the antiabortion constitutional project. While activists privileged the defense
of certain shared constitutional values, members of the anti-abortion
movement also demanded concrete evidence of progress. Over the
course of the next several decades, anti-abortion constitutionalists
had to choose between short-term success and the promotion of
their basic constitutional values. Gradually, some activists came to
the conclusion that at least in the foreseeable future, the movement
could not have both.

Second Time Around, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 229 (Thomas W. Hilgers
et al. eds., 1981).
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 64, at 210 (on the movement’s difficulties
in securing a human-life amendment).
183. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 56 (1976)
(describing its holding as a “logical and anticipated corollary to Roe v. Wade” and the right it
announced); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977) (explaining that the Court’s holding
“signals no retreat from Roe (v. Wade) or the cases applying it”).
184. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 63, at 139–44 (on the emphasis put on a human life
amendment).
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III. ORIGINALISM AND THE POLITICS OF ROE, 1980 TO THE
PRESENT

The Reagan administration reshaped both anti-abortion
constitutionalism and the political practice of originalism. At the
time that Reagan’s presidential campaign revived interest in a
jurisprudence of original intent, it still seemed to clash with antiabortion constitutional priorities. Nonetheless, Reagan suggested
that the judges he selected would overrule Roe—not because they
believed in the existence of constitutional fetal rights, but rather
because they saw Roe as bad constitutional law. For abortion
opponents in the 1980s, originalism came to seem a realistic
compromise solution. If they could not guarantee constitutional
recognition of the right to life, the argument went, abortion
opponents could reasonably settle for the overruling of Roe.
Conservative originalism promised to deliver this result.
In the mid-1980s, however, abortion opponents were divided
about the importance of judicial nominations and about the value of
originalism. Some movement members believed that only direct
confrontation could change laws on abortion. After Robert Bork’s
failed 1987 bid to become a Supreme Court Justice, members of
mainstream groups like the NRLC and Americans United for Life
invested more in presidential politics and federal nominations. Bork
emerged from the hearings as a symbol of the lost opportunity to
overrule Roe—to abortion opponents, he represented the elusive
fifth vote to overrule the 1973 decision. Convinced that Bork had
been victimized by left-wing interest groups, abortion opponents
concluded that they had not done enough to counter attacks on
Reagan’s nominee and his originalist arguments. In the coming
years, abortion opponents vowed not to repeat this mistake. In the
late 1980s and beyond, movement members put new emphasis on
federal judicial nominations and on originalist attacks on the Roe
decision. Whether or not it was a second-best solution, originalism
became a powerful tool used to chip away at Roe.
A. Framing the Conservative Originalist Coalition, 1981–1987
In the 1980s, when the term “originalism” came into vogue,
think tanks and attorneys associated with groups like the Federalist
Society and the Heritage Foundation popularized first-generation
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originalist arguments. 185 These theorists provided an intellectual
framework for demands made by both abortion opponents and New
Right groups intent on changing the laws governing issues from
school prayer to sex education. 186 In turn, leading legal thinkers in
the Reagan administration, like William French Smith and Edwin
Meese III, drew on contentions forged by New Right lawyers. 187
By 1987, originalism was both an interpretive method and the
basis for a constitutional coalition that brought together a variety of
right-leaning social movements. 188 Joining this alliance offered
tangible benefits for abortion opponents. By uniting with the large
and influential New Right and Religious Right movements, abortion
opponents could more effectively pressure Congress and the Reagan
administration. Moreover, in adopting originalist arguments, the
anti-abortion movement could promote its agenda in a way that
resonated with the legal mainstream.
What later came to be seen as conservative first-generation
originalist scholarship had already developed a good deal by 1980,
when the Republican Party platform proposed “the appointment of
judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family
values and the value of human life.” 189 The platform became
instantly controversial, given Reagan’s apparent indifference to the
value of impartiality or to the qualifications of judicial nominees. 190
The Reagan campaign quickly backtracked, explaining that Reagan
would nominate qualified nominees who opposed judicial
overreaching rather than committed abortion opponents. In early
October 1980, Reagan told the press that the platform was not
185. See, e.g., Amanda Hollis-Bruskey, Support Structures and Constitutional Change:
Teles, Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 516, 523–
24 (2011) (“[I]n the early 1980s, conservative movement patrons began forging alliances with
the Federalist Society, from whose ranks several young, idealistic lawyers committed to
conservative and libertarian principles were drawn into positions of leadership both in
conservative [public interest law firms] and in the Reagan Justice Department”);
SOUTHWORTH, supra note 26, at 23–25, 27–29 (on the coining of the term “originalism”).
See, e.g., TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 145.
186. See, e.g., SOUTHWORTH, supra note 26, at 27; TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 139.
187. See, e.g., Hollis-Bruskey, supra note 185, at 524; SOUTHWORTH, supra note 26, at
23–25.
188. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 215–26 (on originalism as an expression of the
coalition politics of the New Right).
189. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Politics of the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1980, at A23.
190. See id.
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referring exclusively to abortion when it mentioned a respect for
life. 191 The following month, William French Smith, a long-term
Reagan ally and campaign manager, reframed Reagan’s interest in
anti-abortion judges as a desire to select only those judges who
rejected what Smith saw as the judicial activism of the Warren and
Burger Courts. 192 Smith explained, “In a nutshell, [Reagan’s]
political philosophy is the laws of this country should be interpreted
by the legislature and construed by the judiciary, and to the extent
possible, not made by the judiciary.” 193 Given Reagan’s prior
commitment to anti-abortion judges and his need to address legal
critics, abortion opponents could easily have understood Smith’s
statements as code for opposition to abortion. As importantly,
Reagan’s new commitment to judicial restraint helped to identify it
as a constitutional strategy uniting otherwise diverse conservative
social movements.
However, Reagan’s first Supreme Court nominee, Sandra Day
O’Connor, cast doubt on the connection between Reagan’s
commitment to a philosophy of strict constructionism and his antiabortion credentials. In her time as an Arizona legislator, O’Connor
had several opportunities to weigh in on policy questions involving
sex and reproduction. In the early 1970s, she had signed a statement
calling for population control in the United States that had been
drafted by Dick Lamm, the leader of an effort to reform Colorado’s
abortion ban. 194 O’Connor had also been an acquaintance of Dr.
Carolyn Gerster, a recent president of the NRLC, the nation’s largest
anti-abortion group. After the nomination was announced, Gerster
immediately informed the rest of the anti-abortion community that,
during her time in the Arizona State Legislature, O’Connor had
voted in favor of an abortion liberalization bill. 195
Abortion opponents were outraged by the nomination. Dr. John
Willke, then-president of the NRLC, threatened to attack O’Connor
in the press if her nomination were not withdrawn. 196 In the late

191. See id.
192. See, e.g., Fred Barbesh & Mary Thorton, Smith Outlines Strategy to Curb Court
Activism, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1981, at A1.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., CRITCHLOW, supra note 15, at 199.
195. See, e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON
THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 95 (2005).
196. Memorandum from Marilee Melvin to Edwin Meese (July 6, 1981) (on file in
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1970s, anti-abortion organizations like the NRLC began to partner
with newly mobilized evangelical protestants and religious
conservatives who formed groups like the Moral Majority and
Christian Voice. 197 During the 1980 election, anti-abortion
organizations had also worked with strategists like those who had
founded the New Right, including veteran political operative Paul
Weyrich and direct-mail guru Richard Viguerie. 198 Abortion
opponents who were part of a united political front seemed likely to
enjoy greater political influence and financial support. 199
The backlash to O’Connor’s nomination brought together
abortion opponents and New Right activists who condemned the
nominee’s supposed support for abortion. However, only a handful
of abortion opponents—some of them belonging to Religious Right
or New Right organizations—expressed their opposition to
O’Connor by referring to concerns about original intent or judicial
activism. Gordon Jones of United Families for America, a Religious
Right lobbying group that opposed abortion, gay rights and
pornography, explained that O’Connor’s supposed approval of Roe
proved her judicial philosophy to be irrevocably flawed. As he
asserted: “[T]he issue is not abortion but judicial activism. Roe v.
Wade happens to be the worst example of judicial activism in this
century.” 200 He even addressed the Supreme Court, suggesting that
the Justices should be concerned about the “seriousness of the loss
of faith experienced by the federal courts in recent years.” 201
In his congressional testimony, Dr. John Willke of the NRLC
elaborated further on this argument: “The Supreme Court’s 1973
abortion decision had no authentic basis in the Constitution. Rather,
it constituted the most extreme example of ‘judicial activism’ in this
century.” 202 In testifying before Congress on O’Connor’s nomination,
he contended that O’Connor was, by definition, an activist if she
regarded “the 1973 abortion decisions as constitutional.” 203

Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California).
197. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 65, at 587–89.
198. See, e.g., id.
199. See id.
200. Confirmation of Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 378 (1981) (statement of Gordon Jones).
201. Id. at 380.
202. Id. at 282 (statement of Dr. John Willke).
203. Id.
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Before the confirmation hearings began, the Reagan
administration paid little attention publicly to the anti-abortion
attacks. An anonymous aide told the New York Times: “there’s going
to be a lot of sound and fury, but in the end, it’s going to end up
signifying little or nothing.” 204 Less publicly, however, administration
officials argued that more had to be done to convince the movement
that originalism would spell the end for Roe.
In a memorandum to Edwin Meese III, a key Reagan advisor
and future attorney general, an administration official claimed that
anti-abortion advocates believed that the courts “had been engaged
in a systematic effort to prevent the people from working their will
on the subject of abortion.” 205 In fact, movement members had
never emphasized such an argument. The White House—not
activists—had stressed the subject of judicial overreaching. 206
The memorandum continued, “Whatever one might think of
that argument, or of the merits of abortion itself, the intensity of
right-to-lifers on the issue of judicial power should not be
underestimated.” 207 The memorandum proposed a nomination
strategy that would cater to anti-abortion advocates without
appearing partisan: “It does not follow that an abortion opponent
should be nominated. It does follow, I think, that the nominee’s
record on the issue be examined with special interest and that the
nominee regard Roe v. Wade and its progeny as most unwise
assertions of judicial power.” 208 Although several years would pass
before the Reagan administration would be in a position to
implement the ideas set forth in the memorandum, the basic
204. Hedrick Smith, Reagan’s Court Choice: A Deft Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1981, at A17.
205. Memorandum from Michael Uhlmann to Edwin Meese (July 6, 1981) (on file with
the Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California).
206. Some arguments against judicial activism circulated within the anti-abortion
movement in the early 1970s. For example, the Board of Directors for the National Right to
Life Committee passed a resolution condemning the Roe Court for its “irresponsible exercise
of raw judicial power.” Resolution by National Right to Life Committee Board of Directors
(July 10, 1973) (on file with the Gerald Ford Memorial Library, University of Michigan).
Similarly, two New York state-based groups, Celebrate Life Committee and Women for the
Unborn, circulated a pamphlet on the issue of curbing judicial activism. Pamphlet by Celebrate
Life Comm. and Women for the Unborn (1973) (on file with the Gerald Ford Memorial
Library, University of Michigan). However, as this Article shows, concerns about judicial
overreaching did not motivate a majority of movement members.
207. Memorandum from Michael Uhlmann to Edwin Meese, supra note 205.
208. Id.
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outline of a strategy was in place: the Reagan administration could
mobilize abortion opponents by criticizing the Roe Court’s
activism.
The O’Connor nomination revealed divisions between the
legal theorists, who had crafted effective originalist rhetoric, and
the abortion opponents, who had not fully identified with it. Over
the course of a decade, an originalist constitutional coalition
would bridge this gap as abortion opponents and social
conservatives came to believe that originalist arguments had
important strategic value.
B. Anti-abortion Legalism Versus Direct Action, 1981–1987
For many within the anti-abortion movement, however,
O’Connor’s nomination played one part in the movement’s
disillusionment with conventional legal strategies. After Reagan’s
election, abortion opponents believed that they had the votes to pass
a statute recognizing the personhood of the fetus. 209 Alternatively,
movement members believed they could pass a measure, the Hatch
Amendment, that would return the abortion issue to the states. 210
Debate about the Hatch Amendment confirmed that the
movement remained committed to the idea of a fundamental right
to life, although activists were divided about Hatch’s proposal.
Movement pragmatists like John Willke urged his colleagues to
endorse the Hatch Amendment for strategic reasons. 211 If the Hatch
Amendment were to pass, Willke suggested the movement could
later pursue its true constitutional agenda—the protection of a
fundamental right to life. 212 More absolutist activists viewed the
proposed amendment as a “betrayal of all the [movement’s]
principles.” 213 The Hatch Amendment controversy demonstrated
that the movement still prioritized the recognition of a constitutional

209. On the campaign for the human life bill, see, e.g., Joan Beck, The Pro-Life Groups
Turn to Congress on Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1981, at B2; Abortion Foes Offer Bill, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 11, 1981, at 8; Bernard Weinraub, Abortion Becoming a Top Priority Issue in
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1981, at A18.
210. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 160, at 160–66 (discussing the Hatch Amendment).
211. See, e.g., Leslie Bennetts, Anti-Abortion Forces in Disarray a Year After Victories in
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1981, at B2.
212. See, e.g., id.
213. President’s Column: Beware of False Friends, ALL ABOUT ISSUES, Sept. 1981 (on file
in the Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas).
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right to life. Even supporters of the Amendment viewed the undoing
of Roe—the most that conservative originalism could promise—as at
best a temporary and partial solution.
By the spring of 1982, the progress of both the Human Life Bill
and the Hatch Amendment had stalled, prompting a crisis of faith in
the movement. Some angry abortion opponents called for a statute
stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in abortion cases. 214
Although Reagan had emphasized abortion and other social
questions on the campaign trail, his administration prioritized
economic issues, disappointing abortion opponents who had
expected major legal changes from an ally in the White House. 215 In
1983, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Services, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe and struck down a model multirestriction abortion statute that many abortion opponents had
championed. 216
One columnist explained the anti-abortion response to such
rulings: “Unable to change the Constitution through the traditional
political process, in the legislatures, the anti-abortion forces have
either degenerated into terrorism or are patiently waiting for the
next appointment to the Supreme Court.” 217 For some abortion
opponents, the setbacks of the early 1980s revealed legal strategies to
be counterproductive and hollow. Perhaps for this reason, the mid1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in clinic protests. 218
Organizations such as Joseph Scheidler’s Pro-Life Action League and
Randall Terry’s Operation Rescue mounted massive demonstrations
outside of clinics, blocking entrances and increasing “sidewalk
counseling” and other forms of contact with women approaching
the clinics. 219 The same frustrations may underlie an alarming

214. On proposals to strip the Court of jurisdiction over abortion cases, see, e.g., Fred
Barbash et al., In The Administration, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1982, at A2.
215. See, e.g., Curtis Wilkie, The Reagan Impact, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1983.
216. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983),
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
217. Ellen Goodman, Abortion Politics, BOS. GLOBE, Jul. 23, 1985, at 11.
218. See, e.g., STAGGENBORG, supra note 71, at 130; CAROL J. C. MAXWELL, PRO-LIFE
ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA: MEANING, MOTIVATION, AND DIRECT ACTION 86 (2002).
219. On Scheidler, see, e.g., Linda Witt, Man With a Mission: Joe Scheidler Pulls No
Punches in the Campaign Against Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1985, at 10; JAMES RISEN &
JUDY THOMAS, THE WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION WAR 101–32 (1998);
CUNEO, supra note 66, at 61–66. On Operation Rescue, see, e.g., id. at 217–314; Faye
Ginsburg, Rescuing the Nation: Operation Rescue and the Rise of Antiabortion Militancy, in
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increase in violence against abortion providers and clinics. By the
mid-1980s, 62 clinics had been firebombed, and 24 attacks occurred
in 1984 alone. 220 Clinics reported an additional 200 bomb scares. 221
The Chicago Tribune reported the following in 1985: “A growing
number of activists on both sides of the abortion controversy predict
that civil disorder growing out of the [abortion] issue will dwarf
anything the nation endured during the civil rights and antiwar
movements of the 1960s.” 222
Other abortion opponents interpreted the setbacks of the 1980s
as reason to work harder to guarantee the nomination of sympathetic
(and presumably originalist) judges to the federal bench. In a
dissenting opinion in Akron, Justice O’Connor criticized Roe’s
trimester framework and asserted that most of the disputed abortion
ordinance should be upheld. 223 O’Connor’s dissent reinforced some
abortion opponents’ convictions about the importance of Supreme
Court nominations. In a newsletter to AUL constituents,
Northwestern Law professor Victor Rosenblum explained: “That
means we are but two—maybe one—Justices away from a Court that
would reverse Roe if given the right chance . . . . The pro-life
movement must therefore get prepared immediately with optimal
reversal strategies.” 224
During the 1984 election season, conservative attorneys predicted
that in his second term, Reagan could nominate as many as five justices
to the Supreme Court. 225 The record of those nominated in his first
term, O’Connor and William Rehnquist (a former associate Justice who
had been made Chief Justice), suggested that constitutional law would
change if Reagan added more like-minded justices. 226
ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950–2000, at 227–37 (Rickie Solinger
ed., 1998).
220. See Witt, supra note 219.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453–73
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
224. Marcia Chambers, Advocates for the Right to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1984, at
SM94.
225. See, e.g., Walter Robinson, 2d Reagan Term Could Shift Course of Supreme Court,
BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1984.
226. Rehnquist had dissented in Roe and joined a dissenting opinion in Danforth
favoring a narrow interpretation of Roe. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171–77 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92–105 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Between 1984 and 1986, moreover, an originalist constitutional
coalition took shape, making conservative originalism more
appealing to abortion opponents. After Reagan won the 1984
election, right-wing think tanks found themselves in a position of
unprecedented influence. Some groups, like the Heritage
Foundation and the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress,
had been active since the late 1970s. 227 Others had formed more
recently, like the Center for Judicial Studies, founded by James R.
McClellan, a former staffer for Senator Jesse Helms (R–NC). 228 In
the mid-1980s, however, these groups gained influence, particularly
after Edwin Meese became attorney general. 229 Meese consciously
embraced what had become known as originalism. 230 Long an
important ally of groups angry about existing policy on matters from
racial discrimination to states’ rights, Meese proved to be a brilliant
popularizer of originalist rhetoric. 231
As importantly, Meese popularized originalist arguments, clearly
connecting them to political results like the overruling of Roe. In a
widely reported July 1985 speech, Meese endorsed an “endeavor to
resurrect the original meaning of the Constitution.” 232 He urged
courts to focus on discerning the motives of the Constitution’s
framers and, if necessary, looking to the history and context of
particular constitutional provisions. 233 In the Supreme Court,
Meese’s Justice Department presented originalism as a solution for
the problem identified by anti-abortion constitutionalists. In an
amicus brief in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, Meese’s Justice Department emphasized “[t]here is no
explicit textual warrant in the Constitution for a right to an

227. On the Heritage Foundation, see, e.g., CRITCHLOW, supra note 15, at 122. On the
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, see, e.g., id. at 129, 163, 201.
228. See, e.g., Anthony Podesta, Court-Packing, Reagan Style, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
1985, at A27.
229. See, e.g., Al Kamen & Howard Kurtz, Theorists on Right Find Fertile Ground,
WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1985, at A1; Ideas Move Nations: How Conservative Think Tanks Have
Helped to Transform the Terms of Political Debate, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 1, 1986, at 7.
230. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 14, at 599; TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 145.
231. On Meese’s role as an ally of social conservatives, see, e.g., SEAN WILENTZ, THE
AGE OF REAGAN: A HISTORY, 1974–2008, at 180 (2009).
232. Meese’s Legal Fundamentalism, CHI. TRIB., July 15, 1985, at 8.
233. See id.
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abortion.” 234 Roe, the brief contended, ignored the history of the
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and the likely intentions of
its Framers. 235 The brief served as a reminder that any judge who
prioritized the intentions of the Framers would overrule Roe. Meese
also shared the commitment of abortion opponents and other
grassroots activists to remaking the courts. At a time when Patrick
McGuigan of the Free Congress Foundation and John Willke of the
NRLC created projects to influence the Reagan Administration’s
judicial nominations, Meese told the media that he hoped such
nominations would be his greatest legacy as attorney general. 236
For abortion opponents, conservative originalism emerged as the
basis for an attractive constitutional coalition that united legal
theorists, Religious Rights champions, free-market advocates, and
members of the Reagan Administration. Certainly, some members of
this alliance deeply believed in the values of rule of law, judicial
humility, neutrality, and deference to democratic majorities
expressed by conservative originalists. 237 For other members,
however, conservative originalism did not perfectly reflect their
constitutional beliefs. In particular, abortion opponents recognized
that originalism would at most ensure that Roe was overruled.
Originalist judges would be unlikely to recognize the existence of an
implied right to life. Nonetheless, the concrete benefits of joining
the originalist coalition were becoming evident. James McClellan put
the point succinctly: “One or two more appointees to the Supreme
Court, and one way or another, Roe v. Wade will fall.” 238
Anti-abortion constitutionalists’ interest in judicial nominations
again increased in 1986, when the Court decided Thornburgh,
striking down a multi-restriction Pennsylvania statute. When the
Thornburgh Court again confirmed the validity of Roe, anti-abortion
constitutionalists noted that only five Justices joined the majority
opinion. Doug Johnson of the NRLC insisted, “We’re just one vote
234. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. Of Obst. & Gynec., 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495), 1985 WL 669705, at
*24–25.
235. See id. at *27–30.
236. See, e.g., William Johnson, The Push to the Right, GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 5, 1985,
at 12 (on Meese and McGuigan’s statements). For the NRLC’s emphasis on nominations, see,
e.g., Phil Gailey, Abortion Knits Religious Right into GOP Fabric, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1986,
at B8.
237. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 217–20.
238. Robinson, supra note 225.
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away from a court which may be prepared to abandon Roe vs.
Wade.” 239 Willke simply stated, “It will take new people on the
Court to make a difference.” 240
Nonetheless, as we shall see, some abortion opponents did not
enthusiastically support the nomination of Robert Bork, a living
symbol of originalism and a known opponent of Roe. Before his
defeat, some abortion opponents still believed that Bork’s
nomination and his promotion of originalism were “not [. . .] prolife issue[s].” 241 With Bork’s failure, however, leading abortion
opponents, Willke among them, began using originalist rhetoric as a
rallying cry for the movement’s substantive demands. In defeat, Bork
served as a reminder of the importance of federal court nominations.
Abortion opponents set aside their foundational constitutional belief
about the right to life in signing on to the originalist agenda. If
originalist judges overruled Roe, the argument went, that was likely
the best the anti-abortion movement could hope for.
1. The lesson of Robert Bork
Robert Bork, Reagan’s 1987 nominee to the Supreme Court,
was the most visible originalist opponent of Roe. During the 1981
hearing for his nomination to the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
Bork stated: “I am convinced . . . that Roe v. Wade is an
unconstitutional decision, a serious and wholly unjustifiable judicial
usurpation of state legislative authority.” 242
Although abortion opponents mobilized to support Bork, prochoice opposition to the nomination was more intense, sustained,
and organized. At the July 1987 National Convention of the
National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), the
organization prioritized Bork’s defeat and distributed “Bork
Busters” buttons to all attendees. 243 Organizations like NARAL, the
National Organization for Women, and the Planned Parenthood
239. William K. Stevens, Margin of Vote Is Called Key to Abortion Decision, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1986, at B11.
240. Id.
241. Dan Hortsch, Anti-Abortion Group Draws Lesson, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct.
18, 1987, at B4.
242. Aaron Epstein, Nominee Could Be Pivotal Vote on a Number of Major Issues, PHILA.
INQ., Sept. 13, 1987, at E3.
243. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Advocates Draft Anti-Bork Campaign, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
July 13, 1987, at A13.
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Federation of America joined an alliance called the Block Bork
Coalition, which was intended to derail the nomination. 244 The
Block Bork Coalition tested strategies designed to present Bork as an
extremist. After conducting extensive focus group research in August
1987, the Coalition developed “themes” and “talking points”
memos that offered the broad outlines of a strategy to defeat Bork.
The August “Themes Memo” contended that if Bork succeeded,
particular political results would be guaranteed. He would “provide
the decisive vote to turn back the clock for a number of decisions,”
including those on abortion. 245
For its part, the Reagan administration framed the issue as
“whether judges and the courts are called upon to interpret the
laws . . . or whether judges and the courts should write orders and
opinions which are, in effect, new law—the activist view.” 246 Since
1986, the administration had been concerned about what one
Reagan aide described as “opposition efforts to position the federal
courts as ‘the tool of the far right’ under Reagan.” 247 In September
1987, the administration responded that “[i]deology should have no
part” in Bork’s hearings. 248
Abortion opponents endorsed Bork’s nomination. Doug
Johnson of the NRLC explained, “We don’t know Bork’s views on
abortion per se . . . . We support him on the basis of his judicial
philosophy and his position on Roe.” 249 Willke was much more
insistent, writing in 1987 that the Bork nomination involved “the
most crucial prolife [sic] vote in 14 years.” 250 Abortion opponents
held sporadic rallies in favor of the nomination, and attendees of the
NRLC Convention applauded when a speaker predicted that Bork
would soon join the Court. 251 Generally, however, abortion

244. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHATZEL, PEOPLE RISING: THE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ROBERT BORK 36–61 (1989).
245. Id. at 138.
246. Judge Robert H. Bork, The President’s Nominee to the Supreme Court: Overview
(July 28, 1987) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
247. Memorandum from Tom Gibson to Patrick Buchanan Re: Judicial Appointments
Theme (Feb. 24, 1986) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
248. Judge Robert H. Bork , supra note 246, at 1.
249. Abortion Is Hot Political Issue Again, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 11, 1987, at 2.
250. Eileen McNamara, If Permitted Many States Would Ban Most Abortions, BOS.
GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1989, at 1.
251. For examples of the rallies held by abortion opponents, see, e.g., Carol Trujillo,
Abortion Foes Rally in Support of Bork, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 4, 1987, at 30A; Anti-
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opponents were not fully convinced that Bork’s originalism was
deserving of passionate support. As Kay C. James, the NRLC Public
Affairs Director, explained after the failure of the Bork nomination:
“The first time out you didn’t see the pressure or the wrath or
intensity of the pro-life movement because we didn’t really see the
Bork nomination as a pro-life issue.” 252
Ironically, it was the failure of Bork’s nomination that finally
made originalism more alluring to pro-life constitutionalists. In
attacking Bork, pro-choice advocates made it increasingly clear that
he represented the vote that would overturn Roe. After his defeat
was unavoidable, Bork publicly denounced Roe, attributing antiabortion “demonstrations, marches, television advertisements, [and]
mass mailings” to the Roe Court’s activism. 253 Because the Court
had not relied on constitutional text or history, as Bork portrayed it,
the Roe Court was “perceived, correctly, as political.” 254 He
described a threat to the Supreme Court’s legitimacy and “integrity”
that was no longer abstract but evident in social and political
events. 255
Originalism still seemed unlikely to deliver the constitutional
changes abortion opponents had long desired. The stated position of
Bork and other originalists was not that the Constitution protected a
right to life but rather that the Constitution did not protect a right
to abortion. An originalist Court would overrule Roe and return the
issue to democratic politics. From the standpoint of anti-abortion
leaders, overruling Roe would be a tremendous achievement. Just the
same, movement members had long condemned “states’ rights”
amendments that would have once again made abortion an issue of
ordinary politics. Anti-abortion constitutionalists deeply believed that
the Constitution protected the right to life from the vicissitudes of
popular politics. An originalist Court would leave the right to life
vulnerable to public majorities in just the way abortion opponents
had feared.
Choosing to join the originalist coalition, then, involved a
distinct set of tradeoffs. Endorsing originalism made abortion
Abortion Organizer Urges Bork Support, SUN SENT., Aug. 23, 1987, at 8A.
252. Hortsch, supra note 241, at B4.
253. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 116 (1990).
254. Id.
255. See id.
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opponents a part of an influential coalition with the power to shape
nominations to the federal bench. If the movement could impact
Supreme Court nominations, in turn, abortion opponents believed
that they could rid themselves of Roe. In 1990, James Bopp, Jr., the
general counsel for the NRLC, summarized the importance attached
to the nomination process: “We’ve already won the war on
abortion . . . . The only question, I suppose, is whether the decisions
will be 5–4 or 6–3, and frankly, it doesn’t matter as long as you have
a majority.” 256
Beginning in 1990, primarily for strategic reasons, anti-abortion
leaders framed their constitutional vision as an originalist one,
joining conservatives on the courts and in other movements. When
Justice William Brennan retired from the Court in July 1990, for
example, Burke Balch, the NRLC Legislative Director, stated the
following: “We regret that Justice Brennan’s decisions in the area of
abortion did not conform to the Constitution as it is written.” 257
Doug Johnson, another NRLC leader, agreed that Roe was “judicial
legislation at its most extreme.” 258 “Any justice who meets the
president’s criteria of faithfulness to the real Constitution could not
vote to reaffirm Roe v. Wade,” he asserted. 259
When President George H.W. Bush nominated David Souter to
replace Brennan, 260 Bopp explained that his colleagues were
“pleased” that Bush had nominated “a justice who will interpret the
Constitution according to its text.” 261 Johnson similarly stated, “As
far as we know, he has not expressed a judgment on abortion, but
the president has described him as a strict constructionist . . . . We
think Roe has no basis in the Constitution, so the appointment of a
strict constructionist will construe the erosion of Roe.” 262
In the following years, Supreme Court nominations and the
256. Steve McGonigle, Liberals Lose Key Voice on High Court, WIS. STATE L. J., July 21,
1990, at 2A.
257. Robin Toner, Court Vacancy to Challenge President on Volatile Issues: Court
Vacancy Will Challenge Bush, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1990, at 1.
258. Ann Devroy & Ruth Marcus, Court Nomination Is Expected Soon, WASH. POST,
July 22, 1990, at A1.
259. Id.
260. See Anti-Abortionists Warm Up to Bush’s Nominee for Court, HOUS. CHRON., July
24, 1990, at A1.
261. Id.
262. Dawn Weyrich, Souter Surprise Selection for Court, WASH. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at
A1.
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movement’s ability to influence sitting Justices remained a priority
for abortion opponents. By signing on to the conservative originalist
agenda, abortion opponents made themselves part of a powerful
coalition that included New Right attorneys, evangelical protestants,
religious traditionalists, libertarians, and free-marketers. Originalist
rhetoric allowed these groups to speak with a single voice. As
importantly, conservative originalism proved to be an effective
weapon in the struggle to build popular support. Because
conservative originalism appeared neutral and committed to the rule
of law, originalism also resonated with the broader public.
Nevertheless, originalism remains only a second-best solution for
abortion opponents—something signaled by activists’ ongoing,
internal commitment to fetal rights approaches. In scholarship, prolifers still sometimes play up the due-process and equal-protection
arguments for fetal rights that once inspired the movement. 263 In
every election since 1987, abortion opponents have pushed a plank
in the Republican Party platform endorsing a constitutional
amendment protecting the fetus’s right to live. 264 In anti-abortion
publications, activists continue to argue for the existence of a
fundamental right to life based on the Declaration of Independence
and the Fourteenth Amendment. 265
In speaking to outsiders, however, members of the mainstream
movement more often claim the mantle of a broader originalist
cause. Americans United for Life has conducted and publicized polls
to establish that “majorities of all parties oppose judicial activism”
and favor the regulation of abortion. 266 In 2012, the group hosted a

263. For a sample of this scholarship, see, e.g., Jack Wade Nowlin, Roe v. Wade
Inverted: How the Supreme Court Decision on Abortion Might Have Privileged Fetal Rights Over
Reproductive Theory, 63 MERCER L. REV. 639, 644–50 (2011); Francis A. Beckwith, The
Supreme Court, Roe v. Wade, and Abortion Law, 1 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 37, 46–54 (2006);
Paolo Torzilli, Reconciling the Sanctity of Human Life, the Declaration of Independence, and the
Constitution, 40 CATH. LAW. 197, 211, 216–17, 222–25 (2000).
264. See, e.g., DOROTHY MCBRIDE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 73 (2008) (“We see, then, that despite 30 years of supporting a Human Life
Amendment, no Republican president has put his political capital into a campaign to pass it.”).
265. For examples of internal writings about the existence of a constitutional right to
life, see, e.g., Mary Meehan, Why Liberals Should Defend the Unborn, HUM. LIFE REV.,
Summer 2011, at 18 (“The right to life underlies and sustains every other right we have.”);
Patrick Mullaney, Principles and Practicalities, HUM. LIFE REV., Summer 2010, at 97–98;
Patrick Mullaney, Unborn Life’s Protection: Exactly What Does Constitute Us?, HUM. LIFE REV.,
Summer 2004, at 50–52.
266. See, e.g., Americans United for Life, Press Release, Americans United for Life Urges
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conference spotlighting the activism of Roe and its progeny, insisting
that the abortion right “has no basis in the text, structure, or history
of the Constitution.” 267 The AUL has recently promoted a book,
Abuse of Discretion, penned by organization leader Clarke Forsythe
that highlights the Roe Court’s departure from original intent. 268 As
Forsythe contends: “At the core of Roe is not the Constitution, nor
values deeply rooted in American history and culture, but a shortsighted view of America and of human liberty.” 269 Similarly, the
National Right to Life Education Trust Fund, the public relations
arm of the NRLC, continues to play up arguments that Roe counts
as “an exercise of raw judicial power.” 270
Notwithstanding abortion opponents’ commitment to the
originalist coalition, that dedication has not fully paid off. Roe has
been weakened but remains good law. Nominees once thought to be
originalists—Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Sandra Day
O’Connor—have voted to preserve Roe. 271 Any advance has come at
significant cost. Conservative originalism constrains the way activists

Senators to Consider New Abortion Polling Data Showing Majorities of All Political Parties
Oppose Judicial Activism, Support Abortion Regulation (May 21, 2009) (capitalization
omitted), available at http://www.aul.org/2009/05/may-21-americans-united-for-lifememo-urges-senators-to-consider-new-abortion-polling-data-showing-majorities-of-all-partiesoppose-judicial-activism-support-abortion-regulations/ (last visited Sep. 4, 2014).
267. Americans United for Life, Press Release, AUL Presents Legal Experts Detailing the
Judicial Violence of Planned Parenthood v. Casey (May 31, 2012), available at http://www
.aul.org/2012/05/aul-presents-legal-experts-detailing-the-%E2%80%9Cjudicialviolence%E2%80%9D-of-planned-parenthood-v-casey/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2014).
268. See generally CLARKE FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF
ROE V. WADE (2013).
269. Kathryn Jean Lopez, Booknotes: Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade
(Jan. 3, 2014), available at http://www.humanlifereview.com/booknotes-the-inside-story-ofroe-v-wade/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2014) (citing FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION).
270. Brochure, National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund, Roe v. Wade: An
Exercise of Raw Judicial Power (2006), in The Mildred F. Jefferson Papers, Box 8, Folder 4,
Schlesinger Library, Harvard University. The NRLC made similar arguments in opposing
Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination to the Supreme Court, contending: “Roe was an exercise in
judicial legislation, aptly branded ‘an exercise of raw judicial power.’” Letter to U.S. Senate on
the
Nomination
of
Sonia
Sotomayor
(July
27,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nrlc.org/federal/judicial/letter-to-u-s-senate-on-nomination-of-soniasotomayor/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2014).
271. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 83 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995) (noting that in Casey, “Reagan-Bush nominees cast the decisive votes to preserve Roe”);
see also Dawn Johnsen, Abortion: A Mixed and Unsettled Legacy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY
304 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006).
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describe their grievances and aspirations. Abortion opponents have
downplayed arguments for a right to life that many activists still
endorse, instead of prioritizing what are believed to be more
immediately impactful originalist rhetoric. In the process, abortion
opponents have done less to popularize the constitutional values
central to the movement’s agenda: arguments about the humanity of
the fetus and the constitutional pedigree of the right to life. Instead
of building support for these constitutional commitments,
movement members remade their arguments in order to fit the
relatively narrow parameters of conservative originalist rhetoric.
Rights talk has become famous for limiting social-movement
members’ ability to articulate, demand, or build support for
important forms of social change. 272 As abortion opponents have
realized all too well, originalism talk can be just as restrictive.
IV. RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE
The evolution of anti-abortion constitutionalism offers valuable
new perspective on theoretical and historical work on originalism.
Historians describe conservative originalism as a site of mobilization
for a wide range of right-leaning activists. 273 Some of these
movement members are seen to have responded to the values of
judicial restraint and fidelity to the rule of law that first-generation
originalist theorists articulated. Other activists supposedly viewed
originalism as a perfect vehicle for guaranteeing conservative
constitutional outcomes.
However, by focusing on the benefits of originalism talk, current
studies obscure its substantial costs for the social movements
endorsing it. Scholars have long documented the difficulties faced by
social movements forced to rely on law or the Constitution in
demanding social change. 274 When a movement focuses on litigation,
272. For discussion of the disadvantages and benefits of rights talk, see supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
273. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
274. On the ways in which lawyers reshaped and ultimately narrowed the demands of
social movements, see, e.g., RISA GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007);
Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change,
92 CAL. L. REV. 755, 755–839 (2004). For further discussion, see, e.g., MCCANN, supra note
8, at 276 (“Taking rights talk seriously [can] clearly shape[] activist[s’] perspectives into
familiar forms and delimit[] their tactical options”); Robert Post, The Supreme Court 2002—
Foreword: Fashioning The Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4,
7 (2003) (offering an example of how rights talk can regulate and constrain politics, creating a
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activists have to use narrow, legalistic, and rights-based language that
poorly captures the wide variety of grievances, aspirations, and beliefs
of movements seeking to remake society. 275 By turning to law, social
movements often find themselves constrained. Of course, rights talk
has also had tremendous value to social-change causes, moving new
activists to action, legitimating movement demands, and framing
them in a way that policymakers are more likely to dignify. 276 Just
the same, the story of rights talk is often one about the difficult
choices made by social movements, especially when activists seek
social change in the courts.
So too is the history of originalism talk. In the story of antiabortion constitutionalism, originalism represented an imperfect
strategic compromise. On the one hand, joining an originalist
coalition allowed abortion opponents to make a difference in the
selection of judicial nominees. Expressing the movement’s views in
originalist terms made abortion opponents part of an influential and
savvy constitutional coalition. Moreover, originalism allowed activists
to speak in a way that made sense to legal and political elites and to
formulate arguments in a way that the public was prepared to
recognize as moderate, rational, and legal. Originalist rhetoric
legitimated anti-abortion claims, lending them a legal and political
respectability they might not otherwise have enjoyed. Signing on to
the originalist agenda also had a significant mobilizing effect,
providing much needed successes that sustained activists frustrated
by the lack of progress the movement confronted in promoting a
human life amendment.
On the other hand, originalism talk constrained abortion
opponents, putting off-limits many of the movement’s longstanding
contentions about a constitutional right to life. Abortion opponents
had to tailor their claims to fit an existing originalist framework.
Activists used time, money, and energy to promote the idea of
originalism that could have been used to popularize foundational
beliefs about the fetus and its role in the American constitutional
tradition. For this reason, originalist reasoning had significant
opportunity costs. Abortion opponents could not as easily publicize

body of law “categorically autonomous from the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors”).
275. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
276. NeJaime, supra note 8, at 668. For more works in this vein, see, e.g., KORNBLUH,
supra note 8; MACLEAN, supra note 8; Dinner, supra note 8, at 580.
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their beliefs or demand that policymakers take those convictions
seriously. Instead of seeking to change public attitudes about fetal
life, the movement used scarce resources to publicize an interpretive
method with no meaningful connection to activists’ constitutional
commitments.
The history of anti-abortion constitutionalism also makes an
important contribution to theoretical scholarship on originalism and
its alternatives. Scholarly understandings of originalism as a political
practice explore its appeal to both conservative social movements and
to the general public. The attraction of originalism to movement
conservatives seems obvious: originalism has proven to be a
remarkably effect tool in the promotion of conservative values and
outcomes. Progressive scholars seek to understand conservative
originalism’s appeal in order to create a compelling theoretical
alternative to it.
The history of anti-abortion constitutionalism offers a different
perspective on what it would mean to create a successful progressive
theory that would replicate the success of originalism. In the story of
anti-abortion constitutionalism, originalism represented an imperfect
tactical decision. Creating a progressive alternative to conservative
originalism would involve a willingness to subordinate important
goals, commitments, and arguments, in the name of short-term
political gain. It is possible to imagine a progressive interpretive
method that would approximate the ideal described by scholars—a
method that would vindicate a social movement’s beliefs while
appearing neutral to the public. The story of anti-abortion
constitutionalism, however, makes clear that conservative originalism
did not represent this ideal for some of those who endorsed it. To
the extent that this history offers any example, creating a progressive
alternative to conservative originalism would involve a tactical
decision to set aside particular constitutional goals or arguments in
order to forge an effective constitutional and political coalition.
V. CONCLUSION
Conservative originalism has had considerable allure. It resonates
with the public and has shaped the constitutional politics of several
Republican administrations and sitting Justices. Since the 1980s,
scholars have experimented with alternatives that would advance
progressive commitments while respecting the will of the people and
the rule of law.
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However, social movement members and attorneys should not
try to replicate the success of conservative originalism without
understanding what it has meant to its constituents. For abortion
opponents, the story of conservative originalism has been one of
coalition-building, difficult constraints, and promises half-fulfilled. It
is worth asking whether that is the kind of success social movements
should pursue.

926

